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ABSTRACT 
Terrorist activity in Southeast Asia remains a challenge to U.S. national 
security.  In particular, terrorist organizations in the Philippines continue to 
conduct deadly attacks and attract more recruits despite U.S. and Philippine 
government counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts.  Within the last seven years 
following the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Philippine and U.S. governments have 
combined efforts to address insurgency as a threat that hinders peace and 
security within the Philippines as well as Southeast Asia.  Despite the ongoing 
counterinsurgency operations in Mindanao, the southern region of the Philippines 
continues to exist as a hub for terrorist recruitment, training, and operations.  
A key aspect of hindering insurgency growth within the Philippines is 
deterring terrorist recruitment by first identifying the underlying conditions that 
promote discontent among the people of Mindanao that make them susceptible 
to the ideology of militant Islam and then implementing a strategy that includes a 
full range of activities from kinetic to non-kinetic methods.  It is clear that 
economic conditions, poor governance, lack of adequate social and educational 
programs are all contributing factors to the instability of Mindanao.   What’s not 
so clear is how to disrupt the cycle that sustains the terrorists while gaining the 
affection of the Muslim minority who have been in opposition with the 
predominantly Christian government.  
This thesis examines the counterinsurgency strategy by recognizing 
effective practices and identifying shortfalls in the approach.  Our findings 
suggest that by applying a mix of soft power, as defined by Professor Joseph 
Nye, as well as noöpolitik as defined by Professor John Arquilla and Dave 
Ronfeldt, in relation to hard power practices, an alternative approach to 
counterinsurgency can offer the U.S. and Philippine governments a long-term 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Terrorist organizations continue to use the southern Philippines as a 
sanctuary for training and recruitment.  Mindanao, in particular, is a fertile land for 
terrorist organizations such as the Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG).  Members of JI, responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing, are thought to be 
hiding in Mindanao.  Meanwhile, members of the ASG, responsible for the 
kidnapping of three American citizens, including missionary couple Martin and 
Gracia Burnham, and the subsequent deaths of two of the three American 
hostages, continue to elude Philippine authorities despite joint U.S. – Philippine 
efforts and ongoing operations to track them down.   
Aside from the JI and ASG, Mindanao has experienced its share of 
violence from renegade members of the Muslim separatist group, the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  The MILF has publicly rejected the jihad against 
the United States and condemned the attack on 9/11, but the organization has 
social ties with and covertly supports the JI.  In particular, the MILF supported the 
thirteen-member group of JI operatives arrested early in 2002 in Singapore while 
plotting to bomb western Embassies.1   In spite of the fact that a handful of 
terrorists have been brought to justice, these terrorist organizations continue to 
threaten the people and stability of the region.  
The U.S. has dedicated financial aid, military training and equipment to 
help fortify the Philippine government’s capabilities to stabilize the region through 
efforts such as denying sanctuary to terrorist groups, isolating them from their 
support base, and capturing or killing terrorist members.  Since 2002, the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the U.S. military have combined efforts to 
restore some level of peace and normalcy to both Muslims and Christians in the 
southern Philippines. These cooperative actions, through training in 
 
1 Mike Millard, Jihad in Paradise:  Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 27. 
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unconventional warfare, have affected ASG’s ability to conduct activities on the 
island of Basilan and marginalized their support base. Yet attaining a successful 
long-term counterinsurgency effort in Mindanao has proven more difficult.  This 
thesis identifies what needs to be done, how, and by whom.  A closer 
examination of both the possible flaws in the U.S.’s current counterinsurgency 
strategy and the interaction between the government of the Philippines and its 
citizens may lead to the development of a more effective approach to dealing 
with radical Islamic movement in the southern Philippines.  
B. RELEVANCY  
Recent violent attacks in Mindanao, including the July 2007 beheading of 
thirteen members of the AFP and the deliberate car bombing of the Philippine 
Congressional building in November 2007, which resulted in two dead and nine 
injured, suggest that the seeds of terror are far from dormant domestically and 
internationally.2   However, this resurgence of violence is not a new condition.  
Radical Filipino groups connected to other extremist elements have long used 
violence as a tool to further their cause.   
For example, consider the October 2001 case of Father Rohan Al-Ghozi, 
code named “Mike,” a key Al Qaeda operative in Southeast Asia.  According to 
Rohan Gunaratna, an Islamic terrorism expert, Al-Ghozi was a Javanese who 
worked as an explosives trainer in Afghanistan and was JI’s number one 
operative in Southeast Asia.3  Al-Ghozi was also the connection between the 
local groups and Al Qaeda, according to former CNN correspondent Maria 
Ressa.4   Ressa described Al-Ghozi as “an empowered local guy,” adding that 
because Al-Ghozi had extensive training, knew the region and could speak all 
 
2 Delon Porcalla, “2 Dead in the Batasan blast: Akbar, Driver Killed, and 12 hurt”, The 
Philippine Star, 14 November 2007, Vol. XXII, No. 109, sec. A. 
3  “Al Qaeda Suspect Sentenced: 12 Years in Philippines Prison for Indonesian Man with 
Terror Links” CBS News, April 18, 2002, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/18/terror/main506549.shtml, (Accessed July 21, 2008). 
4 Former CNN correspondent Maria Ressa has been appointed Head of News and Current 
Affairs at ABS-CBN. Ressa was CNN’s investigative reporter in Asia and was the bureau chief for 
its Southeast Asia operations. 
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the languages, he could blend into the local scene. “He could be a hand, he 
could be planner,” Ressa stated.  “He is that nexus, and part of the reason he 
was so important was that he connected different cells all across the region.”5  
Al-Ghozi was not only a master planner but he was an expert in 
explosives.  Only a year earlier, he had attacked four targets in Manila, including 
an attack on commuter trains in which twenty-two people were killed.  Al-Ghozi 
was arrested in the Philippines on 15 January 2002, a few hours before he was 
to flee the country for Bangkok for an arranged meeting with Riduan Isamuddin 
and other Al Qaeda and JI operatives.  In April 2002, he pleaded guilty to 
charges of possession of illegal explosives, and was sentenced to 12 years in 
jail.6  
While in custody, he revealed to investigators the location in General 
Santos City in Mindanao of a hidden stash of explosives and materials that could 
have easily produced hundreds of lethal bombs. Al-Ghozi confessed that he had 
provided the explosives used in the Rizal Day Bombings, and had been planning 
to use the remaining explosives to attack embassies in Singapore and Indonesia. 
On 14 July 2003, Al-Ghozi escaped from a high security facility in Manila, 
along with two other prisoners suspected of belonging to the ASG.  During the 
nationwide hunt for these fugitives, Al-Ghozi was killed in a police shootout in 
Mindanao when he attempted to ram a military roadblock.  Soldiers shot Al-Ghozi 
as he tried to detonate a hand grenade; he died on the way to a nearby clinic.7 
Al Ghozi’s notorious emergence provides insight into the new generation 
of terrorists throughout Southeast Asia and their connection to a larger network 
of trained operatives and sympathizers.  Al-Ghozi’s testimony also revealed the 
ability of these radicals to move quickly between parts of the world that are poorly 
governed and inadequately policed where they can find sanctuary.  Given the 
 
5 Maria Ressa, “Passport to Terrorism” CBS News Online Indepth, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/jabarah, (Accessed on June 11, 2007). 
6 Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/fathur_rahman_al-ghozi.htm 
(Accessed on July 21, 2008). 
7 Maria Ressa, “Passport to Terrorism” CBS News Online Indepth, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/jabarah, (Accessed on June 11, 2007). 
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Philippines current political and security environment, radical groups are 
attracted to Mindanao where they can train and recruit more members. 
Confronting this regional issue as part of the global fight is a challenge in itself.  
To compound the issue, there remain inconsistencies in the U.S. 
counterinsurgency operations, the Philippine government’s strategy in dealing 
with terrorism, and the Philippine government’s efforts in dealing with its citizens.  
Perhaps the inconsistencies can be partly attributed to their joint COIN effort, 
which addresses the immediate threat while arguably providing limited staying 
power.  Furthermore, militant Islamic groups within the Philippines have 
continued to destabilize peace negotiations between Muslims and Christians in 
Mindanao.  Ongoing terrorist activity threatens the safety of the general 
population throughout the country and disrupts any chance of prosperity for all 
ethnicities.  This thesis seeks to offer alternative approaches to this persistent 
problem. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Recent studies have examined the rising threat in the Philippines, and 
they do offer some useful insight into a range of approaches, from U.S.–
Philippine theater security cooperation programs to AFP preemptive military 
actions.  However, while these various strategies and approaches have enjoyed 
some level of success, they also suffer from limited effectiveness in that they 
produce short-term results.  Therefore, this thesis will attempt to answer the 
following questions: 
1. What are the conditions contributing to the grievances in Mindanao 
and the subsequent spread of Islamic extremism there? 
2. What are the linkages between operational and strategic successes on 
Basilan that have enabled successful COIN there? 
3. Is the Basilan model applicable to other COIN operations in Mindanao 
as well as other conflicts in the world?   
4. How can soft power and noöpolitik be implemented to reduce terrorist 
recruitment?   
 5
                                           
D. METHODOLOGY 
There is an extensive body of research on the history of militant Islam in 
Southeast Asia, which examines the extent of the militant threat to the region.  
The research examines the links between regional and transnational networks. 
Much of the strength of these scholarly works lies in their analyses of the 
networks that recruit new members into existing organizations and new cells. 
Most of these studies are relevant in establishing the background of terrorist 
groups examined in this study.  However, many of them minimize the threat of 
militant Islam by describing these radicals merely as groups of bandits or thugs 
engaged in local criminal activity.   
This thesis presents a theoretical, informative and comparative case 
analysis of Basilan and Mindanao that studies the broad application of both hard 
and soft power.  Specifically, the study analyzes both the impact of hard power 
as it is applied in Basilan and the subsequent soft power effects in Mindanao, 
using Nye and Arquilla’s definitions of soft power and noöpolitik.8  These effects 
will be quantitatively measured by considering the independent variables of U.S. 
and Philippine policy and best practices used in Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines (OEF-P) to determine their impact on the dependent variables of 
public opinion and popular support of the Philippine government. By conducting a 
mixed method study using historical studies, interviews, surveys, and poll 
analysis, this thesis seeks to provide a well-researched analysis of the 
possibilities of an effective deterrence strategy which will yield long-term results.  
 This thesis explores the current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy by 
recognizing effective practices and identifying shortfalls in the current approach.  
Once such gaps have been located, attempts will be made to propose an 
 
8 Joseph Nye, a professor at Harvard and International Relations expert, coined the term 
“Soft Power” in the late 1980s.  John Arquilla, a professor at NPS and an unconventional warfare 
expert, along with David Ronfeldt, furthers the concept of Soft Power by advancing the idea of 
Noöpolitik. 
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alternative strategy by applying elements of soft power, as defined by Nye,9 as 
well as noöpolitik, as defined by Arquilla and Ronfeldt    
 Joseph Nye, a recognized expert in the field of International Relations, has 
written extensively on soft power.11  He suggests that the U.S. should use its 
power, specifically soft power, to attract or entice those who, through their values 
and culture, actively or passively support terrorism.   
 Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s article, “The Promise of Noöpolitik,” offers a new 
perspective on a “revolution in diplomatic affairs,” which defines the traditional 
realpolitik in relation to the more contemporary noöpolitik.12 Too heavy a reliance 
on hard power, or what is more commonly known as military power, impacts a 
nation’s ability to employ noöpolitik, which is defined as an approach or art of 
governing that emphasizes the role of information in expressing ideas, values, 
norms, and ethics.   
 By examining OEF-P through soft power and noöpolitik, the research will 
analyze U.S. and Philippine counterinsurgency strategy and offer a long-term 
sustainable course of action that will diminish future radical Islamic threats by 
reducing recruitment.   A key aspect in deterring terrorist recruitment is to identify 
the underlying conditions that promote discontent that make people vulnerable to 
recruitment.  It is clear that the people of Mindanao have suffered from a lack of 
adequate social, economic, and educational programs.  Socioeconomic factors 
are important in predicting the potential for terrorist recruitment, but these are not 
the only conditions.  These factors, combined with poor governance have 
contributed to the instability there.  Understanding that the U.S. and Philippine  
 
 
9 Joseph Nye, Soft Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).  
10 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Promise of Noöpolitik” First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_8/ronfeldt/index.html. (Accessed on February 17, 
2008). 
11 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and an 
Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration. 
12 David Ronfeldt is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation.  John Arquilla is a 
Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.  In “The Promise of Noöpolitik,” 
they share their views that the power of “the story” is at stake in the worldwide war of ideas. 
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governments may lack credibility with the people of Mindanao, this thesis will 
also examine the best practices and methods to connect the Philippine people to 
their government. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
 Chapter II describes the differences between the terms hard power and 
soft power, and will discuss the importance of soft power in minimizing the effects 
of terrorism within the Philippines.  The theoretical concepts of Nye, Ronfeldt, 
and Arquilla are used in support of this thesis. 
 Chapter III provides a historical overview of events that have led to the 
spread of terrorism in the Philippines.  Chapter III also addresses some of the 
current issues and tensions that are straining the fabric of the country. 
 Chapter IV discusses both pre- and post-9/11 counterinsurgency 
operations on the southern island of Basilan and throughout affected terrorist 
areas in Central Mindanao.  Interviews with the Joint Task Force commanders of 
510, select Special Operations Detachment (ODA) and Civil Affairs Team (CAT) 
members present a unique U.S. military perspective on OEF-P.  The chapter also 
discusses how political constraints may have contributed to OEF-P’s success. 
 Chapter V presents the counterinsurgency struggle from the Filipino 
perspective.  Interviews with key AFP and government officials provide a more 
complete picture of the threat to stability within the country; they also help 
outsiders to understand the Philippine cultural and social dilemmas that 
challenge counterinsurgency operations. 
 Chapter VI proposes a method to validate or invalidate the applicability of 
theoretical approaches.   It also offers suggestions for the operational application 
of soft power, and provides further recommendations based on the results of this 
study.  
 8
                                           
F. SIGNIFICANT WORKS  
 A major source for this study is Soft Power: The Means to Success in 
World Politics, by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.13  Nye coined the term “Soft Power.”  His 
work provides a solid understanding of the meaning of “Soft Power” and its 
relevance to the War on Terror, and provides the conceptual framework for this 
study.  
 Noöpolitik is an approach to diplomacy and strategy for the information 
age that emphasizes the shaping and sharing of ideas, values norms, laws, and 
ethics through “Soft Power.”14 
 Another significant book utilized for this thesis is Militant Islam in 
Southeast Asia by Zachary Abuza.15  Abuza has researched and written 
extensively on the militant Islamic movement.  This book gives historical context 
to the conditions that allowed militant Islam to grow in Southeast Asia.   
 “Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism”, a RAND study by Paul K. 
Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, offers insight into deterrence and 
counterterrorism.16  This study provides useful information about deep-rooted 
problems with deterrence strategies, and offers options for dealing with terrorists 
and their supporters.   
 The theoretical counterinsurgency models of the “Mystic Diamond” by 
Gordon McCormick and “COIN Best Practices” by Kalev Sepp provide a 
framework for analyzing OEF-P operational execution and what is commonly 
referred to as an unconventional approach.  The “Mystic Diamond” is a dynamic 
model that considers the interaction between the state or host  
 
13 Joseph Nye, Soft Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
14 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Promise of Noöpolitik” First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_8/ronfeldt/index.html. (Accessed on February 17, 
2008). 
15 Zachary Abuza. Militant Islam in Southeast Asia (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2003) 
16Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins “Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism” 
(Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2002), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1619. (Accessed on February 17, 2008). 
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nation government, the insurgent or terrorist group, the general public, and the 
international actors or sponsors.17  “COIN Best Practices” historically analyzes 
the nature and staying power of terrorist organizations over time in various 
cultural, political, and geographical settings.18 
 
17 Gordon McCormick is the Department Chair for Defense Analysis at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  His “Mystic Diamond” approach is a theoretical illustration that laid the 
conceptual groundwork incorporated in counterinsurgency strategy of OEF-P, which was written 
about by Colonel Gregory Wilson in, Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operations: OEF-Philippines 
and the Indirect Approach, p. 4 
18 Kalev Sepp is an associate professor in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  His theoretical application of “Counterinsurgency Best Practices” is an article in Military 
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II. SOFT, HARD AND NOÖPOWER 
Grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.  It 
should not only combine the various instruments of power, but so 
regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace19   
B.H. Liddell Hart 
 The U.S. is unquestionably the most powerful country in the world, with 
great capabilities and abundant resources.  So, why is the U.S. finding it so 
difficult to win this war on terror?  Why hasn’t the kill and capture method stunted 
the recruitment of more operatives? How is it that seven years later, the U.S. is 
still struggling to find a way to dissuade youths from joining terrorist 
organizations?  Can the U.S. apply its far reaching power to strategically 
influence other governments to join the global effort in this “long war.”  Although 
many experts have suggested a range of options in applying power to defeat 
terrorism, the reality is, there is a limit to power, especially in the case of military 
power against an unconventional foe. 
 As the U.S. leads the world in the current war, its use of military power has 
dominated the news.  Domestic and international media routinely broadcast 
bombings of villages, raids on homes, and harsh interrogation tactics that 
continue to paint a picture of the U.S. as a world bully.  This has negatively 
affected the U.S.’s image and jeopardized long-standing alliances.  Countries 
that once supported the U.S. no longer allow access to their ports, airstrips, or 
airspaces, while other countries fan the flame of anti-Americanism.    
 The U.S.’s tarnished image and decline of influence abroad has allowed 
its enemies to gain ground—ground that provides a space for terrorists to 
operate, train, and recruit support.  Each new conflict between the U.S. and its 
enemies fuels radical groups.  Additionally, the Global War on Terror is perceived 
as a war against Islam, which further alienates segments of the Muslim 
population and marginalizes other Muslim groups in Christian dominated 
 
19 Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Penguin Group, 1991), 322. 
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societies. Within this marginalized Muslim population, terrorist groups find 
recruits to serve a range of positions from active participants to passive 
supporters.  Similar to AQ, radical Islamic groups such as the ASG and JI rely on 
the full span of support of the people in order to sustain and expand their cause.   
 In 2002, the U.S. and Philippine governments entered a bilateral 
agreement to conduct military training in southern Philippines.  As part of 
Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, the U.S. military is strengthening the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines through counterinsurgency training to separate 
the people from the radical groups.  The training includes a broad net of activities 
from civic action projects to direct action drills.  Despite the relative success of 
OEF-P in defeating the ASG, the U.S. and Philippine governments have been 
criticized over their use of the military to what is largely viewed as a political 
problem, while others speculate whether this short-term military exchange will 
yield a long-term success.  With this in mind, a better understanding of power 
and the balance between soft and hard power is essential in order to address the 
issue of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism in the southern Philippines.  
A. POWER DEFINED 
 To appreciate the impact of power, one must first understand the concept 
of power in general.  In broad terms, power is the ability to influence actions in 
order to achieve a desired outcome.  In other words, “Practical politicians and 
ordinary people often simply define power as the possession of capabilities or 
resources that can influence outcomes.”20 Given this definition, a country such 
as the U.S., with a large military and an abundance of natural resources, is 
powerful.  However, this definition is flawed in that it does not account for 
undesired outcomes.  For example, the U.S. is a powerful nation, yet it could not 
prevent the actions of violent extremist organizations from taking the American 
Embassy in Tehran in 1979, bombing of the American Embassy and Marine 
Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in1983, destroying Pan Am Flight 102 over 
 
20 Joseph S. Nye Jr. “The Benefits of Soft Power,” August 2, 2004: 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archieve/4290.html// (Accessed on January 20, 2008). 
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Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, bombing the World Trade Center in 1993, bombing 
the Khobar Towers military housing in Dhahran in 1996, bombing the African 
embassy in 1998, bombing the USS Cole in 2000, or attacking the U.S. on 9/11.  
 Despite the shortfall in defining power by the capability to influence 
actions, it is understandable why defining power in terms of resources is 
preferred.  It’s easy to measure and quantify.  As Nye stated, “Measuring power 
in terms of resources is imperfect but useful shorthand. It is equally important to 
understand which resources provide the best basis for power behavior in a 
particular context.”21  In the context of counterinsurgency, the true measure of 
power is defined by influencing the people to no longer actively or passively 
supports radical groups.   In Nye’s own words, “power is the ability to influence 
others to get what you want, and there are ultimately three main ways for a 
nation to achieve power: by using or threatening force; by inducing compliance 
with rewards; or by using “soft power”—attracting followers and co-opting 
them.”22  
 Deploying power in appropriate ways by considering the strengths of the 
different instruments of power to include noöpolitik is more challenging that it 
appears on the surface.  For instance, hard and soft power sometimes reinforce 
and sometimes interfere with each other.  “A leader who courts popularity may be 
loath to exercise hard power when he should, but a leader who throws his weight 
around without regard to the effects on his soft power may find others placing 
obstacles in the way of his hard power.”23  Although the two forms of power have 
been misunderstood, the distinctions between them are important and relevant to 
the U.S.’s ability to win the war on terror in general, and its ability to affect the 
stability of Mindanao in particular. 
 
21 Joseph S. Nye Jr. “The Benefits of Soft Power,” August 2, 2004: 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archieve/4290.html// (Accessed on January 20, 2008). 
22 Joseph S. Nye Jr. “The Benefits of Soft Power,” August 2, 2004: 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archieve/4290.html// (Accessed on January 20, 2008). 
23 Joseph S. Nye Jr.,  “The Benefits of Soft Power,” August 2, 2004: 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archieve/4290.html// (Accessed on January 20, 2008).  
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B. HARD POWER 
 Hard power, as the term suggests, often involves aggression and is 
associated with the use of military force.  In terms of political tools, hard power is 
a form of political power that lies on one end of the spectrum.  According to Nye, 
“hard power is a nation’s ability to coerce or induce another nation into a desired 
action through the use of threats or rewards. It can involve both the use of force 
or aggression through military action and the use of economic means through 
incentives.”24  Typically, hard power is categorized by coercion and inducements.  
Coercion is the threat or the use of military force, as well as the enforcement of 
economic sanctions.  It is often referred to as the “stick.” Inducement is the ability 
to influence a desired behavior through a reward or an incentive. It is often 
referred to as the “carrot.”25  
1. Limits of Hard Power  
  Extensive reliance on hard power presents a number of potential pitfalls 
for U.S. policy.   Military force can be used inappropriately, hindering the U.S. in 
achieving its national objectives and eroding public support.  Military force can 
also undermine existing alliances and lead to the creation of hostile coalitions. 
Yet another criticism of hard power is that once it ends, the affected state or 
organization can and often does revert back to its original behavior.  
Furthermore, it requires clearly articulated and understood demands and 
continuous assessments.    
Perhaps the most significant drawback to hard power is the cost.  The 
Congressional Budget Office estimates that, to date, “$440 billon has been spent 
fighting the war on terror.  Funding for the U.S. operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have averaged about $93 billion a year from 2003 – 2005 and are 
estimated at $171 billion for 2007.  Current estimates expect the cost to continue 
 
24 Joseph S. Nye Jr. “The Benefits of Soft Power,” August 2, 2004: 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archieve/4290.html// (Accessed on January 20, 2008). 
25 Joseph S. Nye Jr. “The Benefits of Soft Power,” August 2, 2004: 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archieve/4290.html// (Accessed on January 20, 2008). 
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to rise, with $193 billion expected for 2008.”26  What is not so widely discussed 
by supporters of the war is the real cost of military force, and the consequences 
paid for that choice.  Even more sobering is the human toll: “more than 3,800 
U.S. service members have died to date, and more than 28,000 have been 
wounded.”27  
Proponents and critics both acknowledge that the instruments of hard 
power, typically the Department of Defense, are better funded, larger, and more 
influential than the other instruments of soft power, typically the Department of 
State.  The reality is that soft power institutions are often subordinate to and lack 
the clout of their hard power counterparts.  Still, critics claim that the use of hard 
power in the war on terror has done little to change a deteriorating situation.  In 
fact, much of the hostility against U.S. military action has ignited factors that 
contribute to recruiting more members and supporters of violent extremist 
organizations.  A different political strategy may have achieved more without 
incurring such a considerable cost.  Had the U.S. applied less force and more 
finesse, it is possible that scarce resources could have been used in ways that 
are more judicious, lives could have been spared, and the U.S. could have seen 
a better return on its investment. 
C. SOFT POWER 
 Joseph Nye, who coined the phrase “soft power,” explains that, “[soft 
power] is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payments.  It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political 
ideals, and policies.”28  In other words, soft power is the ability to attract.  This 
should not be confused with the widely used “carrots and sticks” analogy.  
Rather, it is meant to further define soft power as a separate form of power 
 
26 Reuters, “U.S. War Costs in Iraq Up – Budget Report”, January 23, 2008: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/asiaCrisis/idUSN23650654 (Accessed on January 20, 2008).  
27 “What Does Iraq Cost?  Even More Than You Think”, November 18, 2007: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/16/AR2007111600865.html 
(Accessed on January 20, 2008). 
28 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affairs: 
New York, 2004), 28. 
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outside of inducements (carrots) or coercion (sticks).  Soft power is simply 
another form of power to be used in conjunction with or as an alternative option 
to hard power.  Nye offers that, “When a country can induce others to follow by 
employing soft power, it saves a lot of carrots and sticks.”29   
 Soft power seeks to influence or persuade through the power of attraction.  
However, soft power is not the same as influence, which can rest on the hard 
power of threats or payments. Nye explains that, “soft power involves the ability 
to move people by argument, and the ability to attract, which often leads to 
acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power.  
Soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction”.30  
 To clarify soft power is to define what it is not.  It is not economic 
inducement in the form of aid, and it is not military coercion in the form of kinetic 
action.   Economic and military factors can play a role in soft power; however, 
soft power exerts its influence through the appeal of an attractive force.   
 Another way that hard and soft power differ is in the way they are 
employed.  Hard power relies on threats, sanctions, and restrictions that are 
aimed at changing behavior by making a state behave in a way that it would not 
otherwise behave.    On the other hand, soft power is at play if a state chooses to 
act in a manner that is in concert with its desire to emulate another state, or 
because of its attraction to that other state’s values.  
 In the past, the U.S.’s soft power was effective and successful in many 
parts of the world.  For example, Radio Free Europe broadcasts to communist 
Eastern Europe attracted many listeners to include many young people in the 
former Soviet Union.  Radio Free Europe provided an alternative to the state 
controlled information and provided people with another side of the story which 
appealed to many within the Iron Curtain.31  Although many listeners were drawn 
 
29 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affairs: 
New York, 2004), 28. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Radio Free Europe www.rferl.org/content/article/1073305.html (accessed on September 
28, 2008). 
 17
                                           
to the station to hear western music, they also received messages of American 
values and policies.  To many academics, this effort was not so much a war 
against communism but rather a war against ideas which was largely won by 
America’s soft power.   
 In the current war on terror, Nye’s theory of soft power is helpful in 
addressing questions often raised about U.S. strategy.  For instance, to what 
extent can the U.S. tackle this global issue alone while bypassing unwilling or 
incapable allies to defeat terrorism?  In the case of Syria, prior to 9/11 the Syrian 
leadership provided intelligence to the U.S. despite a history of strained political 
relations.  Today, the United States’ relations with Syria are even more strained.  
Nye argues that rather than being less dependent on countries like Syria, 
America will become increasingly dependent on other nations to help defeat 
terrorism within the borders of those countries. 
Although the need to partner with other nations has increased, American 
soft power continues to decline.  Countries such as Britain and Spain, with whom 
the U.S. has shared a strong relationship, are backing away from U.S. policies.  
Meanwhile, polls capture a dramatic downturn of popular opinion in Islamic 
countries.  Nye further supports this decline in American soft power by stating 
that, “In Indonesia, the world’s largest Islamic nation, three quarters of the public 
said they had a favorable opinion of the United States in 2000, but within three 
years that fraction had shrunk to 15 percent.”32 Yet according to Nye, “the 
cooperation of these countries is essential if the United States and its allies are to 
succeed in a long-term struggle against terrorism.”33  
The Philippines is an example of this type of government cooperation with 
which the U.S. seeks to partner.  While the U.S. is unrivaled militarily, it cannot 
monitor every part of the world, nor should it act alone.  Appealing to common 
 
32 Joseph Nye, “Politics in an information age is not only about whose military wins but 
whose story wins”, February/March 2005, Boston Review, 
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/nye.html, (Accessed on April 27, 2008). 
33 Joseph Nye, “Politics in an information age is not only about whose military wins but 
whose story wins”, February/March 2005, Boston Review, 
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/nye.html, (Accessed on April 27, 2008). 
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interests, creating an attraction of shared values, and fostering a willingness to 
consult others can seems difficult; however, such tasks are necessary in order 
for the U.S. and other nations to pursue collectively desired outcomes such as 
the defeat of terrorist organizations.34  
1. Limits of Soft Power 
 Some skeptics object to the idea of soft power because they think of 
power narrowly in terms of commands or active control.  In their view, imitation or 
attraction does not add up to power.  Not all imitation or attraction exerts much 
power over policy outcomes, and neither does imitation always produce desirable 
outcomes.  For instance, in reviewing Nye’s 1990 work, Bound to Lead: The 
Changing Nature of American Power, Tysha Bohorquez makes the case that, 
A country has more soft power if its culture, values and institutions 
incite admiration and respect in other parts of the world.  Diplomacy 
and a nation’s standing in international bodies enable it to build 
alliances.  Crucial to understanding Nye’s concept of soft power is 
the importance of U.S. popular culture worldwide.  From 
McDonald's to Hollywood movies, to the heavy U.S. flavor of the 
Internet, US culture has influence worldwide.  Also relevant to the 
concept of soft power is the lure of the U.S. style of government 
widely esteemed for its freedoms and for the opportunity it offers 
immigrants.  From these examples, Nye argues that, in both 
political and cultural terms, the U.S. has a great deal of soft 
power.35 
But attraction is often an important source of influence.  The skeptics who want to 
define power only as deliberate acts of command and control are ignoring an 
important aspect of power: the ability to achieve the outcomes desired without 
having to force people to change their behavior through threats or payments.  
 
34 Tysha Bohorquez, "Soft Power -The Means to Success in World Politics", December 2005, 
UCLA International Institute, Tysha Bohorquez reviews Joseph Nye Jr.'s book on the importance 
of soft power, http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=34734, (Accessed on April 
27, 2008). 
35 Tysha Bohorquez, "Soft Power -The Means to Success in World Politics", December 2005, 
UCLA International Institute, Tysha Bohorquez reviews Joseph Nye Jr.'s book on the importance 
of soft power, http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=34734, (Accessed on April 
27, 2008). 
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Perhaps the most significant limitation is based more on the uncertainty that 
shrouds this concept versus the capability itself.   It’s difficult to know exactly 
when soft power has had an impact and how it was achieved.   At best, efforts to 
measure the effects of soft power are viewed as murky. 
2. Arguments Against Soft Power 
 Despite the logic and usefulness of soft power theory, not everyone holds 
Nye’s view.  His critiques include David Frum, a former speechwriter to President 
George W. Bush, who is credited for coining the phrase “axis of evil,” and 
Richard Perle, co-author with Frum of “An End to Evil: How to Win the War on 
Terror.”  Both Frum and Perle consider themselves “realists,” advocating an 
aggressive approach to dealing with terrorists.  They fully reject Nye’s concept of 
soft power.  In fact, Frum and Perle describe America’s soft power approach in 
dealing with the budding problem of terrorism as weak-willed.  Frum and Perle’s 
vision of the world is black and white, defined by an “us against them” mentality.  
Bohorquez explains that, “while some argue that the U.S. government has 
overstepped its boundaries in the international arena, Perle and Frum claim that 
overthrowing the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq was not enough.  Frum 
and Perle support the use of military action against North Korea, Iran, Syria, 
Libya and Saudi Arabia.  To them, soft power is irrelevant for a country without 
military rivals.”36  This philosophy disregards the possibility of the co-existence of 
hard and soft power.  
 However, this rejection of soft power is not limited to Perle and Frum. 
According to Bohorquez, “[Former] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is 
another skeptic of soft power.  In fact, he admits to not even understanding the 
term, claiming that popularity is ephemeral and should not guide U.S. foreign 
policy.  Rumsfeld asserts that America is strong enough to do as it wishes with or 
without the world's approval and should simply accept that others will envy and 
 
36 Tysha Bohorquez, "Soft Power -The Means to Success in World Politics", December 2005, 
UCLA International Institute, Tysha Bohorquez reviews Joseph Nye Jr.'s book on the importance 






                                           
resent it.  According to him, the world's only superpower does not need 
permanent allies; the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice-versa.”37 
D. NOÖPOLITIK 
 Throughout the remainder of this thesis, the ideas of soft power and 
noöpolitik will serve as discussion points in the analysis of the Philippines, and 
more specifically U.S. government policy and U.S. military activities in the 
southern Philippines. 
 Nye’s concept of soft power has served as the springboard for Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt’s notion of noöpolitik, which is a “new approach to diplomacy and 
strategy.”38  More specifically, noöpolitik emphasizes the role of informational 
soft power as an important aspect of dealing with other organizations or nations. 
To clarify, Arquilla and Ronfeldt offer the following points to illustrate the 
differences of the more widely known realpolitik as compared to newer 
of noöpolitik:39
 
37 Tysha Bohorquez, "Soft Power -The Means to Success in World Politics", December 2005, 
UCLA International Institute, Tysha Bohorquez reviews Joseph Nye Jr.'s book on the importance 
of soft power, http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=34734, (Accessed on 27 
April 2008). 
38 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Promise of Noöpolitik” First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_8/ronfeldt/index.html. (Accessed on June 20, 2008). 
39 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Promise of Noöpolitik” First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_8/ronfeldt/index.html. (Accessed on June 20, 2008). 
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Table 1.   Realpolitik as compared to Noöpolitik 
Contrast between realpolitik and noöpolitik. 
Realpolitik Noöpolitik 
States as the unit of analysis Nodes, non–state actors 
Primacy of hard power (resources, etc.) Primacy of soft power 
Power politics as zero–sum game Win–win, lose–lose possible 
System is anarchic, highly conflictual Harmony of interests, cooperation 
Alliance conditional (oriented to threat) Ally webs vital to security 
Primacy of national self–interest Primacy of shared interests 
Politics as unending quest for advantage Explicitly seeking a telos 
Ethos is amoral, if not immoral Ethics crucially important 
Behavior driven by threat and power Common goals drive actors 
Very guarded about information flows Propensity for info–sharing 
Balance of power as the “steady–state” Balance of responsibilities 
Power embedded in nation–states Power in “global fabric” 
   
 Arquilla and Ronfeldt assert that soft power lacks operational clarity that 
requires further explanation in two ways:   
 1. Soft and hard power require making a distinction between the two 
concepts which may or may not be based on what many consider to be non-
military versus military power.   
 2. Soft power is not always “good,” and hard power is not always 
“bad.”  In fact, soft power can be wielded in shadowy ways by not-so-good 
people as in the case of Hitler or Osama Bin Laden.40   
 According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, noöpolitik is “ultimately about whose 
story wins.”41  Noöpolitik is centered on ideas and how those ideas influence 
people to behave or act in deliberate ways.  For example, America’s principles 
and values of freedom, rule of law, respect for human rights, and humane 
treatment of individuals shape its domestic and foreign policies.  Unfortunately, 
                                            
40 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Promise of Noöpolitik” First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_8/ronfeldt/index.html. (Accessed on February 17, 
2008). 
41 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Promise of Noöpolitik” First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_8/ronfeldt/index.html. (Accessed on February 17, 
2008). 
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the perception that the U.S.’s actions are contrary to these very principles and 
values has affected its soft power and noöpolitik. 
E. AMERICA’S SOFT POWER AND NOÖPOLITIK 
 The events of 9/11 opened a new chapter in history that reflects a growing 
love-hate relationship between the U.S. and the world.  Polls and surveys 
indicate that a decline in American soft power is affecting its image and its ability 
to influence other nations.  Dr. Steven Kull testified before a House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs on the results of a study on world public opinion taken in 26 
countries.  According to Kull, the BBC World Service/Globe Scan poll revealed 
that, “only 30 percent agree that the U.S. is having a mostly positive influence in 
the world while 51 percent say that the U.S. is having a mostly negative 
influence.”42  Even in Great Britain, which has good relations with the U.S., 
favorable opinions of the U.S. decreased from 83% in 1999/2000 to 56% in 
2005/2006.43  
 
42 Steven Kull, “America’s Image in the World,” March 4, 2007, Testimony before House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and 
Oversight: http://www.worldopinion.org (Accessed on January 21, 2008). 
43 . Steven Kull, “America’s Image in the World,” March 04, 2007, Testimony before House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and 
Oversight: http://www.worldopinion.org (Accessed on January 21, 2008). 
 Figure 1.   Opinions of the United States 
 It may appear that the primary reason for this decline in favorable opinion 
is the war in Iraq.  However, although many countries did not support U.S. 
military action in March 2003, favorable opinions have continued to decline even 
four years after the invasion.  The disparity between pre- and post -9/11 and the 
steady decline since 9/11 suggest that something deeper is at play.   
 According to a BBC poll, focus groups were questioned on their opinion of 
U.S. values, culture, and policies.  The majority of countries support American 
values of human rights and democracy, and many still favor American culture, 
which they often experience through movies and music.  Rather, the 
overwhelming numbers of complaints were based on the perception that the U.S. 
was not living up to its values, especially in foreign policy.  Although many 
countries supported the removal of Saddam Hussein, they disagreed with the 
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unilateral decision by the U.S. to invade Iraq.  This was seen as hypocritical, in 
that the U.S. was promoting values that it did not practice.44  
 Large majorities of people agreed that “it was a good thing that the 
Americans knew what it was like to be vulnerable.”45  Startling results show that 
over 70% of non-Americans believe that the world would be improved if the U.S. 
faced a rival military power.  These polls suggest that U.S. soft power is not only 
deteriorating, but that the projection of American hard power has detracted from 
America’s ability to flex its soft power muscles.   
 Further research taken during A World Public Opinion Poll in October 
2006 reveals that 75% of Americans felt that the most important lesson of 
September 11 was that the “U.S. needs to work more closely with other countries 
to fight terrorism, while 24% said that the U.S. needs to act on its own to fight 
terrorism.”46  The poll goes on to note that “Americans not only prefer a 
multilateral approach when dealing with terrorism, they also perceive that a 
unilateral approach can be counterproductive.”47  This is in line with a previous 
poll conducted in December 2004 by the Opinion Research Corporation that 
found 71% of respondents agreed with the statement that, “When the United 
States acts alone against terrorism, it makes itself a bigger target than when it 
cooperates with other nations in a coordinated crackdown on terrorism.”48  This 
may suggest why the U.S. and Philippine governments have experienced more 
success in their joint endeavors in the Philippines than the U.S. has in its efforts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
44 Steven Kull, “America’s Image in the World,” March 04, 2007, Testimony before House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and 
Oversight: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org  (Accessed on June 20, 2008). 
45 Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, America Against the World: How We Are Different and 
Why We Are Disliked (New York: Times Books, 2006). www.pewresearchcenter.org, (Accessed 
on January 28, 2008). 
46 “US Role in the World,” http://www.americans-
world.org/digest/overview/us_role/multilateralism.cfm, (Accessed on June 22, 2008). 
47 “US Role in the World,” http://www.americans-
world.org/digest/overview/us_role/multilateralism.cfm, (Accessed on June 22, 2008). 
48 “US Role in the World,” http://www.americans-
world.org/digest/overview/us_role/multilateralism.cfm, (Accessed on June 22, 2008). 
  
Figure 2.   America’s Role in the World49 
  
 The U.S. and Philippine governments implemented elements of noöpolitik 
in that they sought “primacy of shared interests”50 in 2002 when the two 
countries agreed to conduct a joint military exercise, Balikatan 02-1, to 
strengthen the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ counterinsurgency capabilities.  
Despite the challenging media environment of the Philippines where news is 
deliberately sensationalized to sell the story, the U.S. maintained its informational 
integrity by truthful reporting backed by its deeds.  Furthermore, the U.S. military 
employed an active information strategy of getting the story out in front before its 
adversaries could distort or misrepresent the U.S. and Philippine governments’ or 
militaries’ intents or actions.  
                                            
49 “US Role in the World,” http://www.americans-
world.org/digest/overview/us_role/multilateralism.cfm, (Accessed on June 22, 2008). 
50 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Promise of Noöpolitik” First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue12_8/ronfeldt/index.html. (Accessed on June 20, 2008). 
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F. PHILIPPINE HARD POWER 
 The Philippines’ history of employing hard power against insurgents is not 
exclusive to the Muslim Moros.  Rather, the Philippine government and military 
lost public support during the Marcos regime when the military employed harsh 
tactics against civilians while confronting the growing communist and Muslim 
insurgencies.  However, conventional tactics proved to be ineffective against the 
insurgents who garnered support from the people who were largely dissatisfied 
with their national government.   
 Meanwhile, the relationship between the Muslim Moros in the Sulu 
Archipelago and their Philippine government suffered.   Sentiments of alienation 
were provoked by a perceived corrupt government and incapable military.  The 
Moros seeking to defend their traditional practices of Islam, continued to face 
difficult social and economic situations that further aggravated their relationship 
with their Christian majority government.  The Moro struggle is founded on a 
history of perceived marginalization and government policies that have not met 
the needs of the people.  In many ways, the Moros felt that they were not 
legitimate members of the Philippines.  
 To complicate the delicate situation, in the early 1990s, the U.S. reduced 
its security assistance funding which further eroded the Philippine military 
operational capability. Yet, to further exacerbate the issue, charges of human 
rights abuses against the Philippine military and police have created more 
tension.  Meanwhile, membership in the militant Islamic groups has not 
significantly decreased.  In fact, alliances have formed between the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF), MILF, and ASG, and are backed by 
international terrorist networks such as the JI.  The general disaffection of the 
Moros towards their government has created a condition where radical groups 
have formed informal bonds and attracted more members by gaining popular 
sympathy.  
 As part of the government’s unification plan to confront the insurgency 
issue, the Ramos administration began talks with insurgents.  Some insurgent 
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groups entered peace negotiations with their government while the more radical 
groups refused.  They instead turned to acts of violence and terrorism.  
 Although the Philippine government continues to face threats from militant 
Islamic terrorist groups as the ASG and JI, they have recently suppressed the 
growth of these groups, with the assistance of the U.S. government.  “Efforts to 
track down and destroy the ASG and JI have met with some success, especially 
in Basilan and Jolo, where U.S. troops advised, assisted and trained the 
Philippine soldiers”51  in counterinsurgency.  The partnership between the two 
militaries achieved a significant success in 2006 when they launched a mission 
after having received information from the U.S. funded Rewards for Information 
Program.  “The Armed Forces of the Philippines began a major offensive against 
the ASG and JI on the island of Jolo.  This offensive was remarkably successful 
and resulted in the deaths of Abu Sayyaf leader Khadafy Janjalani and his 
deputy, Abu Solaiman”.52 
 In many ways, the Philippine government’s application of hard power 
contributed to the growth of insurgencies.  But there’s a general consensus that 
the joint efforts of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the U.S. military has 
reduced the radical groups in number and capability. 
G. PHILIPPINE SOFT POWER AND NOÖPOLITIK 
 According to the State Department’s country book, “The great majority of 
the Philippine population is bound together by common values and a common 
religion.”53  The country book further breaks down the 88.71 million people in the 
Philippines as 94% Christian (85% Catholic, 9% Protestant), 5% Muslim, and 1% 
 
51 Allen G. Miller, “Philippines:  Counterinsurgency Campaign”, Edited by Ronald E. Dolan 
(1991) http://www.libraryofcongress.gov  (Accessed on January 28, 2008). 
52 “Rewards for Justice Pays $10 Million in Philippines; $5 Million Reward Each Paid for Two 
Abus Sayyaf Terrorist Leaders” (June 7, 2007). 
http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index/cfm?page=p_payout&language=english; (Accessed on 
March 10, 2008). 
53 Chester L. Hunt, “Philippines Religious Life,” Edited by Ronald E. Dolan (1991) 
http://www.libraryofcongress.gov   (Accessed on January 28, 2008). 
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Buddhist or other.54  The Christian majority makeup of the Philippine society and, 
likewise, the Philippine government has divided the Filipinos along religious lines.  
Throughout Philippine history, the Christians have enjoyed political control and 
economic advantages over the Muslims.  Furthermore, years of government 
neglect have fueled the resentment for the Moro insurgency.  
 The unstable relationship between the Christians and Muslims contributed 
to the volatile political conditions that still exist today. The longstanding tension 
largely stems from the disproportionate wealth of the Christian upper class and 
the poorest of the poor Muslims.  The wealth of the religious elites was often 
acquired by illegal means in a corrupt system.  The Moros assert that they are 
marginalized by the government, and they are “distrustful of any peaceful efforts 
as possible ploys to further expand the government’s control over the people, the 
land and its resources. Ongoing land disputes are among the major factors 
preventing reconciliation between Christians and Muslims.”55 The predominately 
Christian government continues to face resistance from the minority Muslim 
population in Mindanao to integrate them into the national mix.  The government 
simply lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the Moros which further alienates the 
people from their government.  
However, “a significant breakthrough occurred with the 1990 
establishment of an autonomous region in Mindanao where the majority of the 
Muslim population is concentrated.  The establishment of the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) gave Muslims in this region control over 
some aspects of government, but not over national security or foreign affairs.”56  
Unfortunately, the limitations placed on the local government in the ARMM is 
viewed by some Muslims as short of their desired full autonomy, and they feel 
betrayed by the negotiations.  In fact, this sense of betrayal has created break-
 
54 Chester L. Hunt, “Philippines Religious Life,” Edited by Ronald E. Dolan (1991) 
http://www.libraryofcongress.gov   (Accessed on January 28, 2008). 
55 Ross Marlay, “Philippines Regional Autonomy,” Edited by Ronald E. Dolan (1991) 
http://www.libraryofcongress.gov  (Accessed on January 28, 2008).   
56 Chester L. Hunt, “Philippines: Muslim Filipinos” Edited by Ronald E. Dolan (1991) 
http://www.libraryofcongress.gov  (Accessed on January 28, 2008). 
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away groups such as the MILF and ASG that have rejected the peace accords 
and its terms.  Despite the Philippine government’s efforts to appeal to the Moros 
through diplomatic engagements and peace talks, Manila’s soft power approach 
is simply lacking.  This is not surprising given the tense history of the parties 
concerned.  
H. A NOÖSTRATEGY TO BALANCE SOFT AND HARD POWER 
 As the Philippine government’s soft power has decreased, the militant 
Islamic groups’ ability to influence and co-opt the Moros has subsequently 
increased.  The U.S. recognizes that, in order to deal with the immediate terrorist 
threat and meet broader Philippine national issues, it must provide economic aid, 
military training, and civil-military programs to build a mutually supportive 
relationship between the Philippine government and its people.  Much success 
has been attributed to the civil-military programs that aim to limit the influence of 
the militant Islamic groups and the local people, especially in regions where the 
ASG is known to operate.  However, critics warn that U.S. involvement could at 
best weaken the fragile peace negations between the Philippine government and 
the MILF, and, at worst, motivate potential groups to join the militants. 
 Still, President Arroyo faced an increasingly hostile situation in Mindanao 
with a growing violent Islamic insurgency, while the Philippine military’s capability 
to deal with this issue declined.  In response to the situation, President Arroyo 
“requested U.S. help in suppressing the continually escalating insurgent threat in 
the south and agreed to allow U.S. forces to train Philippine troops to be more 
effective in the new Global War on Terrorism.”57    This partnership was the 
beginning of a joint exercise, Balikatan, that would improve the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines’ ability to confront the terrorist groups in the southern Philippines 
while protecting Philippine sovereignty.  The joint exercise included classic 
counterinsurgency training that increased the trust between the people and the 
Armed Forces and improved the legitimacy of the Philippine government by 
 
57 Cherilyn Walley, “A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippines”  
Special Warfare; September 2004, p. 10. 
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meeting the needs of the Philippine people on Basilan.  In order to assess the 
needs of the people, they conducted a humanitarian survey of “60,000 of the 
island’s 350,000 residents that dealt with socio-economic trends and living 
conditions.”58   This led to humanitarian assistance projects such as digging 
wells, improving roads, and building schools, medical and dental clinics.   
 Due to the hostile environment on Basilan, and a recognition of the 
province as the ASG’s stronghold, non-governmental organizations had not been 
to Basilan since the late 1990s.  In fact, “the insurgents had driven away all 
schoolteachers and medical personnel outside the predominantly Christian 
villages of Lamitan and Isabela, leaving the majority-Muslim islanders without 
adequate health care or educational opportunities.  The water was not safe to 
drink, and there was little or no electricity.”59  Through the humanitarian projects, 
however, the AFP on Basilan built a rapport with the people that helped establish 
a positive relationship between the Basilan people and their national government.   
Although the effects of soft power and noopolitik are powerfully effective as seen 
on Basilan, they are often employed in subtle ways, to include public statements 
of support and partnership.   
 During a Commemoration for Victims and Heroes of Terrorism, on July 20, 
2007, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, Kristie A. Kenney, made the 
following comments: 
We especially remember the Filipino victims of the 2005 
"Valentine's Day" bombings, 2004 SuperFerry bombing, the 2000 
Rizal Day bombing, and far too many more.  We can defeat 
terrorism by joining together as one international community 
composed of different nations, faiths, and cultures to reject the fear 
and violence of terrorism; remember and respect its victims; and 
rededicate ourselves to offering communities in conflict-affected 
areas hope through development, education, and jobs. 
 
58 Cherilyn Walley, “Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island” Special Warfare; 
September 2004, p. 30. 
59 Cherilyn Walley, “Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island”  Special Warfare; 
September 2004, p. 31. 
 31
                                           
America is proud to stand with you, Madame President; the Filipino 
people; and representatives of the international community as we 
reject terrorism and violence, and as we respect and honor the 
heroes of peace and freedom, and the victims of acts of terrorism.  
And also as we work together to rebuild so that people have hope, 
so that communities have education and jobs and a future to look 
forward to, so that we create a brighter world where the future is not 
only peaceful but also prosperous.60 
 By publicly announcing the U.S.’s support for the Philippine government’s 
efforts in their mutual effort to fight terrorism, the U.S. Ambassador was not only 
bolstering confidence in the Philippine government, but also promoting stability 
by assuring their citizens that this is a shared goal.  The U.S. Ambassador’s 
message of support to the Philippine government shaped the political, security 
and information environments in an indirect manner that potentially will have long 
term effects.   
I. MILITANT MOROS HARD POWER 
 Despite the Moro’s desire for autonomy, they have not historically agreed 
to what this means or how to achieve it.  Part of the problem stems from the fact 
that the Moros are ethnically divided by language and the practice of Islam.  
According to Graham Turbiville, “the Tausugs, the first group to adopt Islam 
criticized the more recently Islamicized yakan and bajau peoples for being less 
zealous in observing Islamic tenets and practices.”61  These internal differences 
among Moros have added to the instability in Mindanao.  While the Moros desire 
to create an independent Muslim nation, they do not agree on how to pursue 
independence.  
 The disagreement within the Moro community has created more 
radicalized Muslim groups.  The MNLF and its military arm, the Bangsa Moro 
 
60 Kristie A. Kenney, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, July 21, 2007, “Remarks 
Commemoration for Victims and Heroes of Terrorism Malacanang Palace”, 
http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhs236.html, (Accessed on February 17, 2008). 
61 Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Bearers of the Sword: Radical Islam, Philippines Insurgency, 
and Regional Stability”, Military Review (Mar-Apr 2002), 
http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/lessonslearned/philippines/bearers.asp#end57. 
(Accessed on January 21, 2008). 
 32
Army of an estimated 30,000 men, gained the support of Muslim backers in Libya 
and Malaysia.62  Differing goals and tribal rivalries led to a leadership split that 
created a breakaway group, the MILF.  Although smaller and more conservative 
than the original group, the MILF was well armed and continued to engage in 
conflict with the government.  To further complicate the issue, a more radical 
Muslim insurgent group, the ASG, entered the scene in the early 1990s.  
Although the region has experienced periods of ceasefire, these have not led to 
sustained peace.  Government attempts at national reconciliation through 
diplomatic discussions and the establishment of an autonomous but not 
independent Muslim area pacified the Moros for a brief period; however, there is 
no sign that the Moro movement is over.  
J. MILITANT MORO SOFT POWER AND NOÖPOLITIK 
 Many experts believe that the root cause of terrorism is not poverty or lack 
of literacy or even lack of employment but rather ideology, a set of beliefs or 
ideas.  Extremist interpretations of Islam and the belief that Moros are being 
discriminated against and are marginalized are appealing to those who have 
been neglected by their government.  To compound the issue, these Muslims 
lack legitimate means to make changes in their society.  This compels otherwise 
non-violent Muslims to actively or passively support terrorism.  This certainly is 
not a condition unique to Islam.  In fact, throughout history, all major religions 
have attracted followers and compelled them to employ violence.  It seems that 
moderates of every religion are still struggling with an effective way to dampen 
this appeal. 
 What makes this issue even more challenging is the Moros’ effective 
practice of using websites to reach a broad audience.  Specifically, the Moros 
have created a network capable of reaching audiences worldwide through the 
internet on websites as www.luwaran.com, www.moroland.net (not active), 
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www.bangsamoro.com, www.bangsamoro.info, and www.mindanews.com.  The 
content on these websites ranges from general information about Islam to 
sensationalized articles that discredit the government to more edgy videos 
displaying attacks against the Moros, all with the intention of advancing the 
Moros’ own political agenda..  The websites also carry academic papers and 
editorials to appeal to a more sophisticated audience.  In addition to using 
websites, MILF sympathizers are increasingly using YouTube to post videos to 
reach a booming global audience of YouTube visitors. 
 The power of these multimedia websites, although difficult to fully 
measure, should not be overlooked.  Most of these websites have discussion 
forums, online chat rooms, and blogs where people can voice their opinions as 
well as make contact with others. The Moros have created a web resource to 
expand their cause by using information, whether accurate or not, to reach a 
growing population of internet users and to attract more followers. Although the 
general public in Mindanao still lacks internet access, and the Philippines lag 
behind other Asian countries in internet users, the market is growing and new 
technology is making the internet more readily accessible through other means 
such as cell phones, due to both the government’s initiatives to expand 
development and a growing tech savvy population.  In a poll conducted in 2007 
by Internet World Stats, there are 14 million internet users in the Philippines.63  
Although still relatively low compared to other Asian countries, the Philippines 
internet market is quickly growing.  Between 2005 and 2006, the number of users 
doubled.64  The majority of these users are between the ages of 13 to 30 years 
old, which is also the same age group most likely to be recruited into extremist 
groups who may find the rhetoric on these radical websites appealing.  
 It is difficult to control information and often counterproductive to counter 
misinformation.  Employing noöpolitik in an indirect manner may be the most 
effective way to address the Moros’ rhetoric.  Although not directly addressing 
                                            




                                           
any particular issue expressed on the MILF websites, Ambassador Kenny 
counters their claims that the Philippine government committed genocide against 
the Moros in order to expand the Christian control over the land.  The 
ambassador’s speech to the Pacific Area Special Operations Conference, on 
April 17, 2007, stated: 
My story starts with two islands.  The first is Basilan, an 
island in the southern Philippines that in 2001 was a place of 
lawlessness, a place known for kidnap for ransom groups that had 
kidnapped and later killed Americans and other foreign tourists. 
 Jump forward to November 2006, when I visited Basilan – not to 
participate in a kidnap for ransom scheme, but to have lunch at 
Jollibee, a fast food restaurant, with several of my diplomatic 
colleagues.  We were there talking about peace and development, 
but interestingly what the people of Basilan wanted to talk about 
was investment and tourism.  The tide has clearly changed. 
 My story next takes us to an island even further south, the 
island of Jolo.  When I arrived in the Philippines a year ago, I went 
to Jolo and found in Jolo City people who were wary, bordering on 
hostile.  There was not a lot of activity on the streets and people 
were edgy about their own military and certainly not particularly 
interested in seeing U.S. military and U.S. officials in their city.  I 
visited Jolo again a few months ago, in March 2007, and this is the 
scene I saw:  People who were eager to talk to us; street vendors 
who wanted to say hello; people greeting their own military as if 
they were heroes; people eager to see Americans; and people who 
were optimistic about their future even if challenges still remain. 
 These are just two of the many islands that are winning the 
war on terrorism in the Philippines.65 
K. CONCLUSION 
 Clearly, the current image of the U.S. and its decline in soft power and 
noöpolitik warrant a closer examination.  The crux of the counter-insurgency 
problem centers on how much hard versus NoöPower is needed and under what 
circumstances.  Using power effectively involves more than employing precision 
 
65 Kristie A. Kenney, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, April 21, 2007, “Speech to the 
Pacific Area Special Operations Conference,” http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhs236.html, 
(Accessed on February 17, 2008). 
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bombing or applying economic sanctions.  The art of influencing behavior 
through either attraction or co-optation can wield more power than coercion or 
inducement alone.  As Nye states, “Power has never solely flowed from the 
barrel of a gun; even the most brutal dictators relied on attraction as well as 
fear.”66  
 The United States and other advanced democracies will win the war 
against terrorists only if the people of any country support their government over 
radical groups.  The ability to attract the population is critical to victory. The U.S. 
needs to adopt policies that appeal to the foreign and domestic masses, to use 
public diplomacy more effectively to explain common interests with the public, to 
stop squandering its soft power, and to learn better how to combine the elements 
of NoöPower with hard power if it is to meet current challenges.67  
As noted earlier, a well-run military can be a source of soft power.  The 
impressive job of the U.S. military in providing disaster relief following the 2004 
typhoons in Quezon region, or humanitarian assistance during the 2005 Indian 
Ocean tsunami, or medical aid and recovery operations for the mudslide victims 
on the island of Leyte helped restore the attractiveness of the United States.  In 
addition, military-to-military cooperation and training programs, for example, can 
establish transnational networks that enhance a country’s soft power.68 This is 
especially important in an environment where there are groups as the MILF 
exerting soft power by propagating their agenda through misinformation.  Soft 
power is an essential element in achieving national interests and deterring 
terrorist activities.  Those who do not fully understand or accept this reality will 
suffer the consequence of losing power to those who do. 
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III. MINDANAO/BASILAN HISTORY 
A. INTRODUCTION OF ISLAM  
 The Philippine Islands were largely undisturbed by regional influences 
until trade began with India, China, and Japan in the 9th century.  Before the 
exogenous influences of Europe, the Middle East, and other Asian countries 
were introduced, most Filipinos (aside from the established rice farmers on 
Luzon) had no concept of territoriality, and identity was essentially associated 
with the barangay – the equivalent to a small village.69  Any group identity 
extending outside the barangay likely did not exist until the arrival of Islam during 
the Middle Ages.    
 Islam arrived in and spread throughout the southern Philippines by two 
primary means: Islamic merchants and missionaries.  The conversion of many of 
the inhabitants of Mindanao, Basilan, and the Sulu Archipelago left an indelible 
impression on the indigenous population.   
 Muslim traders frequently passed through the southern Philippines, many 
of them settling along the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago.  There were several 
reasons for this, but one factor essentially forced traders to settle – at least 
temporarily – and that was the weather.  The trade winds blow in semi-annual 
intervals.  For six months, the winds primarily blow from west to east. These 
winds carried the merchants to Asia.  The winds then change direction for 
approximately the same length of time.  In the days of sail, merchants had few 
options during this time other than waiting for the winds to change so that they 
could return home.  Subsequently, many of the traders (mostly men) settled 
along the routes.   
 Trade between Islamic merchants and Filipinos began as early as the 
Ninth Century.  As trade expanded throughout Southeast Asia along the Malay-
Indonesia and Sulu archipelagos, so did the proliferation of Islam in the southern 
 
69 Ronald E. Dolan, ed. “Philippines: A Country Study”, (Washington: GPO for the Library of 
Congress, 1991). 
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Philippines.  Because of their proximity to the trans-Asian trade routes, many 
southern Philippine islands were populated by transient merchants.70   These 
transients gradually became permanent residents of the islands and the local 
villages.  Often the islanders welcomed the merchants, primarily because of the 
wealth and trading power the merchants brought with them. Traders were often 
wealthier than the indigenous people, which made them influential within the 
local communities.     
 By the 13th century, Islam was established in the Sulu Archipelago, and 
the once transient Muslims were fully integrated into the micro-societies of the 
Sulu Archipelago islands. Islam continued to flourish along the trans-Asian trade 
routes and along the Sulu Archipelago to Mindanao.71  Among the many 
missionaries who spread Islam in the southern Philippine islands, there were two 
who stood above the others.   
 By many accounts, Karim ul’ Makhdum was the first Islamic missionary to 
reach the Sulu Archipelago, arriving in 1380. Subsequent visits by Arab Muslim 
missionaries bolstered the spread of Islam in the southern islands; however, by 
the mid-Sixteenth Century, Muslims had settled as far north as Manila.  
Makdum’s legacy was likely an inspiration for another influential Muslim leader 
who would follow him more than a century later.   
 Sharif Kabungsuwan, a foreign prince, was another prominent leader in 
the expansion of Islam to the Philippines and, more specifically, to Mindanao.  
According to Hannbal Bara, professor at Mindanao State University, 
Kabungsuwan was instrumental in uniting Muslims and establishing the 
sultanates within the region.   
The full Islamization of the west coast of Mindanao was accelerated 
with the arrival of Muhammad Sharif Kabungsuwan. Like Abubakar, 
the first sultan of Sulu, Sharif Kabungsuwan is also an Arab and a 
descendant of Nabi Muhammad (S.A.W.)....He was accompanied 
 
70 Carmen A. Abubakar, “Islam in the Philippines”, 
http://www.ncca.gov.ph/about_cultarts/comarticles.php?artcl_Id=232. 
71 Bruce B. Lawrence, “The Eastward Journey of Muslim Kingship,” Oxford History of Islam, 
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by large group of Sama people who according to Dr. Kurais, a 
Sama scholar Kabungsuwan had passed by Tawi-Tawi and picked 
up some Sama people to accompany him in his journey to 
Mindanao. This means that the coming of Kabungsuwan to 
Mindanao was not accidental. It was the Sama people who guided 
him to Mindanao. During this period, inter-island contact was 
already in place. Both the Sama and the Iranun had already 
explored the many sea routes in the Sulu archipelago. 
It was not long after his arrival that Sharif Kabungsuwan 
established the Sultanate of Maguindanao, possibly in 1516. The 
rise of this sultanate is almost similar to that of Sulu, should be 
viewed as the culmination of Islamization in Mindanao. It was 
actually a political necessity. Clearly, the sultanate was adopted as 
an instrument to consolidate the emerging Muslim communities 
[Grammar and punctuation are as written in the original 
document].72 
 The sultanates empowered Muslims and established a solidarity among 
them that was not seriously challenged until the arrival of the Europeans.  The 
cohesion among Muslims facilitated the expansion of Islam, and Islamic 
missionaries continued to proselytize unabated in the southern Philippines until 
the arrival of the Spanish in the Sixteenth Century. 
B. SPANISH COLONIALISM (1521-1898) 
 The Spanish came to the Philippines in the Sixteenth Century, intending to 
colonize the islands.  One of their first orders of business was to convert the 
entire archipelago to Catholicism as part of a larger campaign to forestall the 
spread of Islam in Southeast Asia.73  European powers had little or no interest in 
wielding soft power and primarily focused on exercising their hard power assets.  
The Spaniards were no different and were likely motivated by an intense hatred 
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of Muslims that resonated from Moorish domination of the Iberian Peninsula from 
the Eighth to the end of the 15th century.74 
  The colonial government had negligible success against militant Muslims 
living in the southern Philippines and never really controlled these Muslim areas.  
Muslim insurgents used vintas, small wind-propelled vessels, to conduct raids on 
Spanish strongholds.  The introduction of steam-powered boats gave the 
Spanish an advantage, as did the fort they built in Zamboanga, on the southwest 
tip of Mindanao.  The Spaniards used the fort as a platform to launch raids 
against militant strongholds in the region.75  This campaign was marginally 
successful.  Raids in Basilan in 1845, in Jolo in 1876, and in the Lake Lanao 
region, coupled with Spanish political pressure, were enough to marginalize the 
sultanates, and eventually led to their collapse.  Still, Muslims continued to 
engage and resist the Spanish, and prevented the colonizers from ever truly 
controlling the southern islands.   
 Spanish rule ended in 1898 as a result of Spain’s defeat in the Spanish-
American War.  Subsequently, the U.S. assumed control of the Philippines under 
the terms of the Treaty of Paris.  Unfortunately the treaty existed only between 
the U.S. and Spain; the same fissures still existed between the disenfranchised 
Moro population and its colonial occupier.  
C. U.S. COLONIALISM (1898-1946)  
 Moro insurgents continued to resist colonialism during the period of 
American rule.  In fact, from 1901 to 1904, insurgents in Sulu carried out a 
guerilla campaign against American forces.  The insurrection undoubtedly 
influenced President Theodore Roosevelt’s decision to suspend the Bates 
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Treaty76 and mount an aggressive counter-insurgency campaign against the 
militant Moros.  Retaliation by U.S. forces was heavy-handed and had little 
regard for soft power effects, as was evidenced by the battle of Bud Bagsak, 
where more than 500 Muslims and only a handful of Americans were killed.  To 
the Moro population, brutish behavior by a colonial power was commonplace and 
noosphere was dominated by way of the military facet of hard power.  The Moros 
received little sympathy from U.S. elites, as evidenced by Woodrow Wilson’s 
foreign policies in the Philippines.   
 When Wilson was elected president in 1912, he shifted American policy to 
“Filipinization,” which integrated Filipinos into the national government.77  Those 
Filipinos given government positions were generally Christian, leaving the 
Muslims with little or no representation.  Filipinization resulted in a shift from a 
policy of brutality to one of discrimination.  Furthermore, there were likely few 
Filipino Christians who were interested in or cared about Moro demands and civil 
rights.78   
 Wilson introduced a relocation policy that further exacerbated the pre-
existing tensions between Filipino Christians and Muslims.  The relocation policy 
encouraged Christians to move to Mindanao, which historically had been Moro 
land.  Christian settlers continued to occupy Muslim lands for decades, widening 
the fissure between two groups.  Relocation was so extensive that the Muslim 
population on the island was reduced from 76 percent in 1903 to just 32 percent 
in 1948.79  During its colonial rule, most American policies involving the Moro 
population, including Filipinization, were counter-productive and did not endear 
the colonial or Filipino governments to the Muslims.  Centuries-old grievances 
were left unresolved, and the emerging independent Filipino government was ill-
equipped to deal with them. 
 
76 Bates Treaty – Peace treaty signed between the U.S. Brigadier General John Bates and 
the Sultanate of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II, on August 20, 1899. 




D. PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE (1946-PRESENT) 
The end of World War II also brought about the end of American 
colonialism in the Philippines.  In 1946, Filipinos were granted their 
independence for the first time in more than 400 years.  Philippine independence 
coincided with the resurgence of Islam that occurred throughout the Middle East, 
and both South and Southeast Asia following World War II, opening the door for 
renewed Muslim calls for independence.   
Since independence, the Philippines have been led by a number of 
corrupt presidents. Several were oppressive, and not only to Muslims.  Every 
president since independence has been a Christian, which further fans the 
flames of Muslim discord.  Taken together, all of these factors acted as a catalyst 
to galvanize extremists to commit terrorist acts, either directly or indirectly, 
against the Philippine government.   
E. FORMATION OF EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS  
The Moros have been oppressed for centuries.  On many occasions, they 
resisted their oppressors, but these campaigns were largely ineffective, as 
evidenced by their continued subjugation to the central government and the 
absence of a Muslim state in the southern Philippines.  There are likely several 
factors that hindered Moro independence movements, including a lack of 
resources, lack of unity, and a growing constituency.  Muslim influence in the 
southern Philippines increased when the Moros themselves began to organize.  
This began in the late 1960s in the form of the Muslim Independence Movement 
(MIM).   
Datu Udtug Matalam, an ardent advocate for Moro independence, initiated 
the MIM in 1968 after the AFP and Christian militias in the region engaged in a 
series of massacres against Muslim villages.  There is no evidence to prove that 
Matalam authorized or sanctioned any armed resistance to the AFP; however, 
some members who were outraged by the atrocities organized themselves into a 
new faction. 
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The MNLF surfaced as an offshoot of the MIM, but with more ambitious 
goals than the parent organization.  The MNLF partnered with the Bangsa Moro 
Army (BMA), giving the organization the hard power that for centuries many 
Moros had desired.  Hard power brought clout domestically and internationally. 
Despite an early military defeat in Jolo, the MNLF rebounded and became 
increasing more successful in its engagements with the AFP.80 
A few prominent leaders emerged into leadership positions within the 
Front.  Nur Misauri and Hashim Salamat were two of the more influential leaders 
in the vanguard of the new Islamic movement.  Misauri eventually assumed 
leadership of the MNLF; Salamat and a few other upstarts contributed to the 
evolution of the MNLF into a formidable, relevant movement.    
The Front’s campaign against the Philippine central government was 
successful until the surge of AFP troops into the southern Philippines in 1975.  A 
stalemate between the MNLF and the government of the Philippines ensued, 
forcing both to negotiate a peace accord that was codified in the 1976 Tripoli 
Agreement. As a result, Misauri’s influence among Moros declined and the MNLF 
was severely weakened.81 
Salamat and several other hard-line Islamists were dissatisfied with the 
peace agreement and the compromises that Misauri made in it.  Once again, the 
Moro resistance split and Salamat created a new faction of the MNLF that 
adhered to the earlier principles of the organization. (Another Islamic group, the 
Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization, was also formed but never gained the 
support of the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] and quickly became 
irrelevant.)  
Salamat intended to create an institution that concentrated on Islam.82   
With the support of Libya and the OIC, he formed the MILF, with a doctrine 
 
80 Rodell, 128. 
81 Ibid. 129.   
82 Cesar Adib Majul, “The Moro Struggle in the Philippines”, Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2, 
(1988), 910. 
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primarily based on religion rather than on the social issues that were the focus of 
the MNLF.  In 1984, Salamat formally commissioned the MILF and immediately 
resumed a campaign for Muslim independence. 
F. CONCLUSION 
 Prior to the arrival of Spanish colonizers in 1521, there was no evidence of 
religious violence in Philippines.  The Spanish successfully proselytized many of 
the indigenous population on the northern and central islands of the Philippines, 
but ran into stiff resistance when trying to convert Muslims to Catholicism.  It is 
obvious that, at that time, many Filipinos considered themselves part of a larger 
group, whether that was Muslim or Catholic.  A pronounced division soon 
appeared among Filipinos that has endured for almost five centuries.  
Oppressive occupation by both the Spanish and the Americans, coupled with an 
independent Philippine government dominated by Catholics that discriminated 
against Muslims, was arguably the root of Muslim grievances.  As a result, an 
insurrection ensued that persisted for much of the Spanish and American colonial 





                                           
IV.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
 The Republic of the Philippines is the unwilling host to several 
organizations that are designated as terrorist groups by the United Nations.  
According to the Terrorism Knowledge Base website, more than fifteen terrorist 
organizations have recently conducted or continue to conduct illicit activity within 
its borders83.  This chapter will focus on the active, major Islamic extremist 
organizations that are indigenous to the Philippines.   
 Shortly after Philippine independence in 1946, the Moros became 
increasingly aware of their Muslim identity. Moro dissatisfaction with the 
Philippine government increased during this period, as Muslims were 
marginalized by political and economic exclusion by the Philippine central 
government.  At the same time, many Moros left the south to study in Manila and 
the Middle East.  These students established personal relationships with Muslims 
from other countries and regions, developing deep bonds that, in some cases, 
would be renewed in subsequent years.  Through these social networks, 
dissident Moros organized politically and demanded that the government in 
Manila establish an independent Moro state.   
B.  MNLF 
 The first relevant organization formed was the MNLF, founded by Nurallaji 
Misuari, who was an alumnus of and former lecturer at the University of the 
Philippines.  While at the university, Misuari was a student activist; he was also 
one of the organizers of the Mindanao Independence Movement, the forerunner 
of the MNLF.  
 The MNLF matured into a viable political organization with a concomitant 
military branch that rivaled the AFP.  During the early to mid 1970s, the MNLF 
 
83 Terrorism Knowledge Base, 
http://www.tkb.org/GroupRegionModule.jsp?countryid=RP&pagemode=group&regionid=5, 
(Accessed on February 2, 2008). 
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and the AFP clashed in several lethal engagements.  As a result, the Philippine 
government signed a treaty that granted the Moros an autonomous region, the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, or ARMM.  The treaty was successful 
at ending hostilities within the region but only temporarily.  Many Moros were 
displeased with the treaty because it fell short of achieving a separate state for 
the Muslim population.  Shortly after the treaty, the MNLF’s power and influence 
withered and its constituents waned as many Moros still wanted more than 
autonomy; they wanted their own state.  A splinter group quickly took root and 
addressed Muslim issues 
C. MILF 
Extremist organizations are prone to fragmentation, and the MNLF was no 
exception.  Salamat Hashim, a former contender for MNLF leadership, was 
dissatisfied with the autonomy agreement and Misuari’s increasingly moderate 
ideology shift.84  Hashim had been a student at Al-Azhar University in Egypt and, 
like Misuari, had networked with many fundamentalists and extremists while 
studying there.  In 1969, having completed all but the dissertation phase of his 
doctoral program, Hashim rose to prominence in the Moro community due to his 
ambition and charisma. 85  He later became one of the most prominent figures in 
the MNLF prior to breaking off and forming his own group, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front.  The MILF was not immune to fractionalization.  Many hard-line 
Islamists were dissatisfied with the faction’s compromises and concessions to the 
GRP.  Khadaffy Janjalani organized a small group of extremists that continued 
the separatist movement under the banner of the Abu Sayyaf Group.  
 
84 “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process”, International 
Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2863&l=1, 3, (Accessed on February 
2, 2008).  
85 Ibid. 
D. ASG  
 Janjalani and his corps of separatists had an inauspicious beginning, in 
spite of their intention to become a relevant organization.  Early ASG operations 
primarily consisted of criminal activities like robbery and kidnapping for ransom; 
however, the group reinvented itself and significantly increased its constituency, 
support, and legitimacy.  In recent years the ASG has become a viable opponent 
to the GRP and AFP.  As the chart in Figure 1 illustrates, the ASG is the most 
active and lethal terrorist group currently operating in the Philippines.  Prior to 
9/11, the ASG controlled significant sections of Mindanao, Tawi Tawi, and Jolo.  
They essentially supplanted the GRP on Basilan island as the governing body 
there.  As previously mentioned, the ASG and its ties to the JI make it the most 
significant terrorist threat to security in the Philippines. 
 
 





Studying the conditions that contributed to the emergence of Islamic 
extremism is necessary to understand contemporary extremist factions.  Islamic 
extremism in the Philippines originated on the island of Mindanao and several 
smaller satellite islands off its coast, including the Sulu Archipelago.  As 
explained in the previous chapters, Spanish, U.S., and GRP policies contributed 
to the dissatisfaction of many Moros living in the southern islands.  This 
dissatisfaction increasingly found expression in the form of terrorism.  At the 
commencement of the GWOT, the island of Basilan was the site where the ASG 
was most active. 
E. PRE 9/11 
The majority of Filipinos embraced their independence from the U.S., but 
social cleavages existed between Muslims and Christians.  It could be argued 
that, in fact, the cleavage grew in the last half century.  There were a variety of 
reasons for this, most notably Christian dominance within the GRP (as 
mentioned in the previous chapter). 
Prior to 9/11, political, social, and economic conditions on Mindanao, 
Basilan, Jolo and Tawi Tawi were abysmal.  Lawlessness was the norm.   Law-
abiding citizens feared for their personal safety while miscreants operated freely 
outside the law.  The AFP could not achieve a hard or soft power advantage over 
the insurgents.  It was routine for the AFP to use heavy-handed tactics in dealing 
with the Moro people.  The Philippine central government and AFP leaders erred 
by adopting a strategy that emphasized the use of violent military force towards 
the Moro population, rather than a strategy that addressed Moro grievances.  
Given the belligerent policy towards Muslims, it’s of little surprise that extremism 
proliferated in the southern Philippines prior to 9/11.   
F. POST 9/11     
 In the wake of al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks against the U.S., President Bush 
initiated the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  He and his administration began 
by reaching out to traditional allies. One of the first leaders he contacted was 
President Arroyo of the Philippines. 
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 Subsequently, the U.S. dispatched military advisors to the Philippines to 
assess and assist the AFP and their campaign against the ASG.  Shortly after 
9/11 and continuing through the end of 2002, the AFP had received more than 
$93 million in military aid from the U.S., along with a commitment to increase 
combined training and operations with the U.S. military.  AFP commanders 
welcomed U.S. assistance, and many expressed their desire to have the U.S. 
military play a significant role in COIN operations on the southern Philippine 
islands.  The Bush administration envisaged a robust force that placed U.S. 
troops in a direct-action role alongside AFP members; however, the Philippine 
constitution prohibited foreign militaries from conducting combat operations on 
Philippine territory.  Eventually, the two governments reached an agreement that 
allowed U.S. forces to conduct operations with their Filipino counterparts by 
acting mainly as advisors and trainers.  However, U.S. and GRP visions of 
combined operations remained. 
 U.S. and AFP forces embarked on their new mission in early 2002 in what 
the GRP advertised as a combined exercise designated Balikatan 02-01,86 and 
which the U.S. designated as Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, or 
OEF-P.  Because of the political sensitivity involved, the operation names remain 
unchanged to this day.  For the purpose of this paper, it will be referred to as 
OEF-P. 
 The first operational forces to deploy in support of OEF-P were part of 
JTF-510 under the command of Brigadier General Donny Wurster, a U.S. Air 
Force Officer who then commanded the U.S. Special Operations Command 
Pacific, or SOCPAC.  Wurster’s strategy to assist the AFP in counter-insurgency, 
or COIN, operations was based on a model developed by Gordon McCormick,87 
a professor and department head for the Defense Analysis Department at the 
Naval Postgraduate School.  
 
86 Balikatan is a Tagalog word that means “shoulder to shoulder.” 
87 Gordon McCormick’s diamond model for counterinsurgency. 
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 JTF-510’s main effort during OEF-P was conducted primarily by Army 
Special Operations Forces, or ARSOF.  ARSOF is composed of Special Forces, 
Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations soldiers whose forte is low-intensity 
conflict.  Wurster’s senior ARSOF commander during OEF-P was 1st Special 
Forces Group commander Colonel David Fridovich.  A highly-regarded group 
commander, Fridovich brought extensive knowledge and experience to the 
Philippines. Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP teams from the U.S. Army Civil Affairs 
and Psychological Operations Command, or USACAPOC, were placed under his 
operational control.  
 One of ARSOF’s informal mantras is that execution occurs “by, with, and 
through the indigenous population.”  SOCPAC’s operations on Basilan were 
conducted precisely in this way.  There were many elements that contributed to 
the command’s success, but it was basic SOF tenets that assured success on 
the island and the JTF's commitment to low intensity conflict that revealed the 
potential of applying precision hard and soft power.  This can be explained more 
clearly by comparing the JTF’s strategy to Kalev Sepp’s COIN best practices, a 
comparison which strongly suggests that there is a correlation between them.  
Sepp posits that these twelve critical steps that can focus on the use of hard and 
soft power must be addressed in order to suppress an insurgency:88   
1. Emphasis on intelligence; 
2. Focus on population, their needs, and security; 
3. Secure areas established, expanded; 
4. Insurgents isolated from population (population control); 
5. Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader); 
6. Effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns; 
7. Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents; 
8. Police in lead; military supporting; 
9. Police force expanded, diversified; 
10. Conventional military forces reoriented for counter-insurgency; 
 
88 Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency”, Military Review, (May-June 2005) 10. 
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11. Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces; 
12. Insurgent sanctuaries denied. 
 
 Each of Sepp’s critical COIN tasks was performed by the JTF to varying 
degrees.  The tasks were often mutually supporting.  For example, by focusing 
on the population’s needs and security, SOF operators and their AFP partners 
were able to gather actionable intelligence about the ASG.  One could even 
argue that accomplishing one or more of Sepp’s practices would cause a 
“domino” effect that would assist in completing the other tasks.  Securing the 
populace frequently denies the insurgents sanctuary, which, in turn, isolates 
them from the populace, which facilitates the expansion of secured areas, and so 
forth.  Sepp’s theory is pragmatic and achievable.  However, one critical variable 
that will ultimately determine the success or failure of a COIN operation is a 
sincere political and military commitment from the host nation’s government and 
the supporting coalition.  Without such a commitment, the legitimate government 
faces the prospect of a protracted fight.    
 The Bush administration remains committed to assisting the Philippine 
government in eradicating terrorism.  SOCPAC has built on the successes of the 
Balikatan operations by branching out to other high-risk areas in the Philippines.  
U.S. – Philippine strategy mirrors Andrew Krepenevich’s “Oil Spot” strategy89:  
that is, control of one geographic area is secured and maintained, then 
operations are expanded to an adjacent area, and this cycle is repeated until the 
objective is achieved.  This was evidenced by recent combined joint task force 
operations on the islands of Jolo and Tawi Tawi, as well as an expanded effort 
on Mindanao.  Current operations showed an increased emphasis in American 
soft power aimed at complementing hard power. 
 
89 Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Win in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-
iraq.html. (Accessed on February 2, 2008). 
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G. CONCLUSION 
 JTF 510 and JSOTF-P operations on Basilan Island were widely 
considered by the SOF community to be the model for conducting COIN.  A 
campaign focused on the population and relied more on non-lethal constructive 
effects rather than the destructive effects of lethal targeting and conventional 
military force.  This focus on noopolitik severely hindered ASG recruiting and 
resource acquisition.  Additionally, the coalition was able to dominate the 
noosphere while simultaneously wielding non-kinetic hard power in the form of 
humanitarian assistance.  The disaffected Moro population on Basilan finally had 
its basic needs met by the GRP, resulting in an increase of coalition soft power, 
and, conversely, a decimating of the ASG’s soft power on the island.  
 The GRP’s shift from neglecting Moro needs to concentrating on and 
addressing them has narrowed the cleavage between the GRP and the Moro 
population.  It is premature to say that the chasm has been completely bridged; 
however, the evidence suggests that GRP and its coalition partners have made 
progress by using an approach that combines noopolitik and realpolitik.  If the 
GRP wants sustainable results, it must adopt a long-term strategy that is 
sustainable and remains focused on the disaffected population. 
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V. FILIPINO DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVE 
To deter and overcome insurgency, government [sic] response 
must be comprehensive and a multi-disciplinary approach.  
Legislation should package polices, [sic] plans and programs that 
directly confront the insurgent threat and simultaneously address its 
root causes. To achieve this, the government has to adopt a 
strategy, which is a holistic approach to overcome insurgency 
nationwide.  This consists of four major components: Political / 
Legal / Diplomatic, socio-economic / psychosocial influences, and 
peace, order and security.  We must include an information 
campaign that [sic] easily understood by all no matter of literary 
education.90 
 To adequately understand any problem, it is necessary to study the 
situation from multiples perspectives.  The insurrection in the Philippines is no 
different.  Analyzing from a Filipino perspective the conditions, motives, and 
opportunities that led to the insurgency will likely provide a better understanding 
of the problem and, subsequently, result in the best the best course of action for 
government of the Philippines to bridge the soft power gap.  
A. CONDITIONS 
 Historically political opportunities for Muslims within the central 
government of the Philippines were virtually non-existent.  The Moros faced 
numerous challenges and obstacles in their efforts to advance their interests 
domestically and internationally.  They have been routinely discriminated against 
and exploited by the GRP.   Because of the exclusive nature of Philippine 
politics, many Moros lacked an understanding of the established political 
process.  Furthermore, Moro grievances were routinely viewed by Filipino 
political elites as illegitimate or irrelevant, further inciting Moro disaffection for the 
government in Manila. In a 2007 interview, Ed Tiongson. Vice President of the 
 
90 Cecilia Dionco, Noble Director of Office of STRATCOM February 8, 2004 1st Barangay 
Counterterrorism Council Meeting. 
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Liga ng Barangay,91 opined on the deficiencies in Moro political opportunities.  
According to Tiongson, there were five obstacles to Moro political participation92:  
1. Widespread misperceptions of and acrimony towards Christians. 
2. Perceptions that the Christian political majority and elites are not 
truly committed to the well being of the Moros.  Moros also believe 
that politicians are power-hungry opportunists that have the 
tendency to extend favors only exclusively to their own clans and 
political comrades, while showing disregard for their constituents. 
3. Moros political agendas largely ignore local politics and neglect 
their own communities.  
4. Incidents of Moro political leaders deceiving, manipulating, and 
exploiting the high illiteracy rate of the Moro population. 
5. A history of neglect by the GRP of the Moro population and their 
grievances. 
To assist in the analysis of these obstacles, as well as the existing social, 
economic, political, and cultural conditions that moved some Moros to extremism, 
this thesis incorporated the Political Process Model from the social movement 
theory.  In Figure 1, American author and professor of Sociology Doug McAdam 
laid the theoretical groundwork for the Political Process Model through the 
paradigm of opportunities available via the established political structure, and, 
more specifically, the opportunity for social movement groups to successfully 
address their grievances.  
 
91 A Barangay is a Filipino community the size of a small town or village. The Liga ng mga 
Barangay sa Pilpinas is a Philippine government agency that represents approximately 49,000 
Barangays. 
92 Personal interview with Mr. Tiongson (2007). 
 Figure 4.   McAdam’s Political Process Model93 
  
 According to the “Political Opportunity” element of the model, any event or 
broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions 
on which the political establishment is structured creates a void in political 
opportunities.94  The political environment in the Philippines is difficult to 
penetrate by a Moro population that has created a fissure between the two 
 As a result, the Moros have gravitated towards the indigenous 
organizational strength element of McAdam's model.  Through the formation of 
such influential groups like the MNLF, MILF, and ASG; the Moro population has 
established a "community" that shares cultural understanding, identity, and 
similar grievances with the GRP.  The aforementioned groups have provided a 
vehicle for radical Islamists to advance their demands for Moro independence.  
Additionally, exogenous influences, namely radical Islamic groups from Indonesia 
and the Middle East, have manipulated the groups’ perceptions of injustice, 
stimulating incitement and provoking rebellion.  
                                            
93 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, 
(The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999), 51. 




 Most historians believe that Filipino Muslims began to effectively organize 
in resistance of the Filipino government shortly after the Jabidah Massacre of 
1968.  The massacre, which took place in Mindanao, left an estimated 100,000 
dead, 200,000 fled to Malaysia, and nearly a million people homeless.  
Historically many AFP soldiers were unsympathetic to the Moros and routinely 
violated the human rights of Muslims.  From the Moro perspective, the so-called 
“Manila Imperialists,” as part of a Christian attempt to colonize Moro lands, 
staged the massacre. The incident is remembered every year in many Moro 
communities, and remains a continuing source of friction.  A more thorough 
explanation of radical Islam’s motivations was discussed in Chapter III.  
Unfortunately, the motives for Islamic Extremism can largely be attributed to the 
AFP’s hard power campaigns against radical and moderate Muslims alike.  The 
AFP’s heavy-handed approach widened the Moro-Christian schism and steadily 
detracted from the government’s soft power in the Southern Philippines. 
C. EXTREMIST OPPORTUNITIES 
Harsh socio-economic conditions often contribute to extremist motivations, 
which in turn, inspire terrorists to seek out vulnerable populations that can be 
leveraged to degrade the state’s soft power while bolstering their own.  For many 
years, Moro radicals have sought to exploit weaknesses in the GRP noöpolitik so 
that the extremists can gain an advantage in the noosphere.  Moro radicals have 
attempted to do this in a variety of ways.  In 2006, Moro extremists carried out 
several violent attacks aimed at degrading GRP soft power by trying to show that 
the GRP was impotent in the Southern Philippines.  During this time, the 
Philippines endured 93 bombings, ranging from improvised explosive devices 
and grenades to landmines.  Major incidents included: 
1. February - the bombing of a karaoke bar near a Philippine military 
base in Jolo left one dead and 22 injured;  
2. March - a bomb exploded at the Sulu Consumers Cooperative in 
Jolo, killing nine people and injuring 20;  
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3. June - a roadside bombing in Shariff Aguak killed three people and 
injured eight;  
4. August - two bombs exploded almost simultaneously in Kidapawan 
City, injuring three people;  
5. September - a bomb exploded at a public market in General Santos 
City, killing two people and injuring six;  
6. October - a bomb exploded near the headquarters of the Sulu 
Philippine National Police in Jolo, injuring two people;  
7. In a separate October attack, three bombs exploded in Tacurong, 
Sultan Kudurat; Makilala, North Cotabato; and Cotabato City, killing 
eight people and injuring over thirty.95  
  
 It is difficult to determine if the extremists achieved the desired affects 
from these attacks.  At a minimum, the offensive showed how vulnerable the 
target population was and that the extremists were undeterred by the AFP.  It is 
also likely that these successes invigorated Moro extremists, thus helping them 
recruit new members and fuel the insurrection.    
 Vice President Tiongson identified several issues that the government 
must address if it genuinely wants to quell the insurrection.  He posits that 
citizens are the most important factor in bringing peace, security and 
development to Mindanao.  He also suggests that how children are raised, 
educated socially, and supported inside the home as well in as the community 
truly makes a difference.  Equally important is the way in which Muslim children 
and youth are treated and nurtured up to the time they become adolescents.  He 
also recognized the need for Muslim youth to experience loving, secure, and 
healthy relationships with others in the community. If the people they observe 
and interact with (parents, friends, neighbors, etc.) provide examples of honest, 




95 Country Reports on Terrorism Released by the Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
April 30, 2007, http://www.state.gov/ct/rls/crt/2006/82731.htm (Accessed 4 July 2008). 
96 Personal interview with Mr. Tiongson (2007). 
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D. GRP RESPONSE 
The Philippine Government now under President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo is faced with myriad problem [sic] in Mindanao 
that continues to destabilize the area.  The major threats come from 
the MNLF-MILF-Abu Sayyaf Group combined and from the 
CPP/NPA/NDF program to set up their own concept of government 
in Mindanao.  The problem, if only internal, may be within the 
capacity of the Philippine Government to solve.97 
 Prior to 9/11, the Philippine government was keenly aware that it had a 
domestic terror problem and committed extensive resources to combating the 
insurgents.  Many Filipino political and military elites believed their stagnant 
counterterrorism campaign needed a jumpstart that eventually arrived in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks on America.  
 Almost immediately after 9/11, the Republic of the Philippines redoubled 
its bilateral counterterrorism efforts with the United States and to this day 
continues its COIN campaign.  In August 2005, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) launched “Operation Ultimatum,” a concerted effort to capture 
or kill top Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) operatives on Jolo 
Island.  The operation has been highly successful to date, as a number of ASG 
and JI members have been either captured or killed since its inception.  
 The creation of the Antiterrorism Task Force (ATTF) was another aspect 
of combined American-Filipino counterterrorism campaign.  The ATTF combined 
the hard power assets of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the AFP in 
fighting terror.  Since its inception, the ATTF has arrested, captured, or killed 88 
suspected terrorists, and seized over 900 kilograms of explosive materials.  
Additionally, the Task Force has made significant progress in tracking, blocking, 
and seizing terrorists’ assets.98  
 Perhaps the ATTF's most notable achievement to date occurred between 
2006 and 2007 when the AFP eliminated both Khadaffy Janjalani, then leader of 
 
97 Delfin Castro, Major General (Retired), Philippine Army “A Mindanao Story: Troubled 
Decades in The Eye of The Storm” Chapter 12: Prognosis. 
98 Country Reports on Terrorism Released by the Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
April 30, 2007, http://www.state.gov/ct/rls/crt/2006/82731.htm (Accessed 4 July 2008). 
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the Abu Sayyaf Group, and former ASG spokesperson Abu Solaiman. Operation 
Ultimatum demonstrated the emphasis of U.S.-assisted strategy to strengthen 
the rule of law in the Sulu archipelago.  Coupled with the Combined U.S.-
Philippine military exercises (Balikatan), the ATTF and the JSOTF-P supported 
the Philippine government’s campaign to separate terrorists from the general 
population and diminish support for their cause.99     
 In conjunction with the counterterrorism operations, President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo aggressively established legislation enhancing cooperation 
between the Republic of the Philippines and U.S. in the War on Terror.  “The 
Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action Against Terrorism”; Memorandum Order No. 
37 dated October 12, 2001 included100: 
 
1. Supervision and implementation of policies and actions of the 
Government against terrorism; 
2. Intelligence coordination;  
3. Internal focus against terrorism; 
4. Accountability of public and private corporations and personalities;  
5. Synchronizing internal efforts with global outlook; 
6. Legal measures;  
7. Promotion of Christian and Muslim solidarity;  
8. Vigilance against the movement of terrorists and their supporters, 
equipment, weapons and funds;  
9. Contingency plans; 
10. Comprehensive security plans for critical infrastructure;  
11. Support of overseas Filipino workers;  
12. Modernization of the AFP;  
 
99 The Philippine Presidential Commission on the Visiting Forces (VFACOM) is empowered 
by Executive Order 199 to oversee the implementation of the Visiting Forces Agreement. The 
VFA Commission is required to annually conduct an assessment and submit a recommendation 
to the President of the Philippines on whether or not the Agreement continues to serve the 
national interest. 
100 “RP-US Enhanced Cooperation on the War on Terror”, Memorandum Order No. 37, 2001 
further specifies the measures that shall be undertaken in connection with the Government’s 
commitment to cooperate in the international struggle against terrorism. 
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13. Media support;  
14. Political, social and economic measures.  
  
 President Arroyo’s policy addressed the most obvious shortcomings in her 
government’s counter-terrorism policies up to that point and was bolstered by an 
infusion of support by way of robust economic and military packages from the 
U.S. and its allies; however, noticeably absent from her policy was a soft-power 
strategy.  Fortunately the GRP adopted a progressive philosophy to combating 
terrorism and the coalition was able to influence its host to adopt a less “kinetic” 
approach to COIN operations.  With the assistance of the U.S. government and 
its military forces, the GRP and AFP started to incorporate non-lethal targeting to 
complement its lethal targeting.  Equipped to apply both hard and soft power, the 
combined Joint Task Force revitalized and enhanced COIN operations in the 
Philippines.   
 The Basilan model was designed to use unconventional means by using 
an indirect approach that employed a combination of both hard and soft power.  
The first step in this approach was to secure the environment, then to develop 
infrastructure, and finally, to sustain these efforts.  The strategy aimed to not just 
address terrorism per se, but to eradicate the very roots of terrorism in the 
Philippines – poor governance.  This translates specifically to poverty, the lack of 
economic opportunities, inaccessibility to economic centers, and the lack of 
education. 
 Gaining the support of the people is crucial to the unconventional 
approach that the U.S. and AFP troops used and are still using in Mindanao.  To 
gain the populace’s support, the task force adopted a strategy that emphasized 
exercising noöpolitik rather than conventional military action.  This approach has 
been well received by many Moros and has won the support of many 
communities in Mindanao.  The effects were almost immediate and could be 
measured by the decrease in terrorist incidents.  
 One proof of the success of this strategy is the fact that, in the six years 
since Balikatan 02-1, there has been a significant reduction of threat groups and 
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crime in Basilan.  In 2002, fifteen AFP Battalions were needed to provide security 
on Basilan.  By 2005, after a successful soft power campaign, only two AFP 
Battalions were deployed in the area to maintain security.  This sustained and 
prevailing peace in Basilan is attributed to the increased socio-economic 
opportunities, which sharply reduced the local population’s support of, and desire 
to join, terrorist groups.   
 Basilan now possesses an environment that is conducive to economic 
activity.  From 2002 until today, almost $2.2 million in humanitarian assistance 
and Civil Military Operations and $4.5 million in USAID initiatives were funneled 
to the development of Basilan.  This translated into 80 kilometers of roads, four 
bridges and two piers and ramps, five water projects, and a number of medical 
and dental missions, all of which benefited the island’s communities.101  In fact, 
because of the strategic success of Basilan and the integration of all three key 
components and/or military techniques, the model used there has gained acclaim 
in numerous publications as a means of addressing the international threat of 
terrorism and eradicating militant Islamic activities in other areas of the globe.  
Throughout the Philippines, from as far south as the island of Sulu to the 
northern portion of Central Mindanao, this method has been employed as the 
blueprint of establishing peace, growth and prosperity. 
 Strategically and tactically, the Philippine government found a military 
solution to the immediate threat of terrorist activities within the country, but it has 
not adequately focused on the political, social and economic aspects of Moro 
grievances in relation to the Mindanao conflict.  The perception of 
counterinsurgency efforts within the Southern Philippines is one of Filipino 
Christian self-determination vs. Muslim reformation.     
This is a double edge sword.  It may have created dent in the 
insurgents but has widen the wedge of the people and the 
government.  The victims are clearly the general populace, and 
 
101 Ms. Michelle Eduarte, a Philippine Government employee in the Department of Foreign 
Affairs; American Affairs,and a member of the VFA commission, is responsible for providing both 
quarterly and annual reports and an overseer in relation to RP-US joint counter-terrorism efforts 
in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. 
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adding “salt” to a suffering, Filipino will only aggravate the situation.  
Unless effective social mitigation programs are in place, such 
diverse reactions will always be felt [Grammar and punctuation are 
as written in the original document].102  
 E. CONCLUSION 
 For a little more than six years, the GRP and AFP have successfully 
campaigned to deter Islamic extremism through multiple indictments of known 
insurgent members of the ASG, JI, and Al Qaeda.  Both domestic and 
international audiences may assume that U.S. diplomatic pressure forced the 
GRP to address its terrorist problem; however, the result has been several 
positive counterterrorism developments: an Anti-Terrorism Bill (or Human 
Security Act), coordination of Philippine interagency, positive feedback of 
communities and military to the U.S.’s Rewards for Justice program, elimination 
of ASG leaders as a result of Operation Ultimatum, and so forth. Other positive 
U.S. contributions that were well received include such programs as MEDCAPS 
and USAID-funded life-improvement projects.  
 Through cooperation between Indonesia, Singapore, the U.S. and 
Australia, the GRP and AFP realized that conventional tactics alone met with 
limited success in battling an insurgency.  Through a comprehensive approach of 
combining hard and soft power, they developed several methods of finding and 
attacking the vulnerabilities in the enemy’s “center of gravity.”  These means 
have isolated the insurgents from enemy intelligence.  They have also affected 
the insurgents’ association with the disenfranchised Muslim communities of the 
southern Philippines that had provided recruits, training areas, and safe havens.  
In addition, the government gained support in the rural areas through 
development programs and social services.  
 Regrettably, the solutions that have so far been offered by most 
development partners, government and non-government alike, are only 
economically focused.  These temporary development programs can, at most, 
                                            
 102 Jose Maria Cuerpo III , Major, Philippine Army, In response to an interview on 11 
November 2007. 
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placate or mitigate, but they do not resolve the issues. The real issue is the 
manner in which Muslim youths are being misled into believing that violence is a 
viable option. 
 The seeds of peace must be sown and then nurtured continuously within 
the Islamic culture, beginning with families, neighborhood groups, and 
community institutions and so on.  The media and the Ligas within the affected 
areas should also be involved.   
 Economic approaches are not the only answer to the problems of troubled 
Muslim youth.  Roads, bridges and other infrastructure are helpful, but only when 
they are paralleled with developing the social infrastructure.  The socialization, 
education, empowerment, and engagement of the youth through meaningful 
activities designed to enlighten, and enhance growth will deter them from 
becoming extremist recruits.  Thus the pro-active, preventive and people 
centered Barangay approach is, perhaps, a better approach for both short and 
long-term peace building strategy. 
 A holistic, integrated and comprehensive approach is required for the GRP 
to defeat the insurgents, particularly one that extends beyond the Fourteen 
Pillars and focuses on socio-cultural-political infrastructure in Muslim-populated 
areas.  A strategy that has an end state of egalitarianism throughout the 
Philippines and that uses all elements of national power is needed.  A truly 
holistic approach is progressive and uses realpolitik and noöpolitik to achieve 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
 Seven years after 9/11, the U.S. government is still struggling with how to 
conduct a war against terrorism.  A staggering amount of resources have been 
exhausted tackling the global threat posed by radical groups.  Still, it is 
questionable how much success the U.S. and its allies have achieved when 
violent groups are still conducting attacks and recruiting more members each 
day.   In fact, it appears that in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, military action 
may be contributing to the perception that the U.S. is waging a war against Islam.  
Sadly, this perception is promoting more violence which justifies the use of 
violence to combat violence.  It’s a dangerous cycle.  
 In the Philippines, the U.S. applied an innovative and simple formula to 
break the cycle of violence.  In fact, it is arguably the most successful campaign 
launched since 9/11.  The joint U.S. and GRP effort focused on the people of 
southern Philippines and not on directly destroying the insurgents.  In fact, 
focusing on the terrorists may create a stronger bond between the terrorist and 
their support . Gracia Burhnam, an American missionary who was held hostage 
by the ASG in Mindanao along with her husband Martin, shares a personal 
exchange between her and one of her captors, Solaiman who harbored a deep 
resentment of the west for its “self-indulgence, immorality, and coarseness.”103 
Using excessive violence to attack the ASG would have perpetuated this view 
and compromised efforts to gain the release of the hostages.  As previously 
mentioned in the Basilan case study, disrupting the cycle of violence through a 
softer approach works.  But for how long and to what extent under what 
circumstances?  Does the U.S. need to transform its military so that it is better 
able to deal with a dynamic environment in a long-term struggle and, if so, in 
what ways? 
 
103 Gracia Burnham, In the Presence of My Enemies,  (Wheaton, Illinois:  Tyndale House 
Publishers, Inc, 2003) 104. 
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A. THE TRANSFORMATION OF WARFARE 
 More than ten years before the 9/11 attacks, Martin van Creveld, in his 
book The Transformation of War, predicted that conventional war was rapidly 
becoming obsolete.  He explained that, “war will be conducted by groups other 
than states and by means other than armies."104  He went on to say that “the 
control over the modern state is diminishing, the utility of large-scale conventional 
forces is decreasing, and the nature of war is changing.”105  Of particular interest 
to this thesis, Van Creveld argues that success in battle will not be guaranteed by 
high tech weapon systems and a superior military force. That is, technologically 
sophisticated armies are not effective against unsophisticated forces who have 
obtained less advanced but more useful means to attack.  Van Creveld's 
prophetic assertion alludes to, perhaps coincidentally, the emergence of soft 
power and noöpolitik.  Today's conflicts straddle between the battlefield and the 
noosphere.  A comprehensive strategy that employs both soft and hard power 
should be routine when planning conventional and irregular warfare. 
 America's GWOT has gone divergent paths in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia.  The situation in Iraq remains tumultuous in spite of the 
abundance of hard power assets there.  Conversely, the AFP and U.S. military 
are conducting successful COIN operations in the southern Philippines with a 
fraction of the material.  The difference can be attributed to strategy.  OIF 
strategy initially emphasized military power and "shock and awe," whereas, OEF-
P strategy emphasized low intensity conflict that employed a combination of both 
hard and soft power.  Fortunately, strategic successes in the Philippines have not 
gone unnoticed by other combatant commanders.  The commander of the Multi-
National Force-Iraq, General David Petraeus, has shifted military strategy in Iraq 
from solely kinetic to a strategy that combines military power, hard power, and 
soft power.   
 
104 Martin Van Creveld, Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 109-112. 
105 Ibid. 109-112. 
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B. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
IDEOLOGICAL 
 Some critics question the need to transform the world’s best military force 
or to consider other strategies.  However, history and current trends indicate that 
merely maintaining the present military while attempting to hold on to existing 
concepts is a shortsighted approach and may prove disastrous.  Global enemies 
in the war on terrorism have transformed, and so must the U.S. military.  
However, the military must choose its course carefully in order to maximize 
positive effects.  Simply advocating all innovative efforts actually is 
counterproductive.  The U.S. must carefully consider what aspects of 
transformation will give the best return for the investment.  Additionally, a change 
in military strategy is necessary, one that includes the application of soft power in 
concert with hard and military powers.   
 Proponents for transformation suggest that unless the U.S. military adapts 
to the information age, it may not retain its elite status for long.  As the dispersion 
of information and the rate of technological change continue to accelerate, 
current U.S. military advantages could diminish comparatively.  Furthermore, the 
former Director of the Office of Force Transformation, Vice Admiral (Ret) Arthur 
K. Cebrowski states, “We cannot delay transformation while we fight the war on 
terrorism.” 106  If it’s largely agreed and widely acknowledged that transformation 
is necessary, is it possible to fight a war while transforming and, if so, what 
should be done to move the military in the right direction at the speed required to 
get ahead?  Any change is bound to be disruptive in the short term.  However, 
not changing could be far more troublesome in the long term. 
 Soft power transformation is not simply a matter of improving current ways 
of conducting operations, and it is not merely about technology.  Former 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated, “All the high-tech weapons in the world 
won’t transform our armed forces, unless we also transform the way we think, 
 
106 Paul Stone, “Cebrowski Sketches the Face of Transformation,” U.S. Department of 
Defense, American Forces Press Service News Articles (December 29, 2003), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27559 (Accessed on 23 September 2007). 
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train, exercise, and fight.”107  In light of the militant Islamic insurgency in 
Mindanao, it is important to incorporate new soft power strategies into the military 
to yield optimal benefits. 
C. ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND THE PHILIPPINES 
 In recent years, there has been an alarming increase in religiously 
motivated violence in Southeast Asia.  This is not to imply that this violence is a 
new phenomenon.  Rather, history is full of religious conflict which is neither 
limited to any particular religion nor land.  What is it about religion that lends itself 
to violence?  Part of the answer lies in the fact that there is a dark underside of 
religion that can be dangerous.  Even though all the major faiths espouse the 
values of peace, love, and compassion, sacred scriptures and traditions contain 
justification for murder and apocalyptic strife.  It is the interpretation of the 
scripture that moves people to act out in anger and revenge in the name of their 
faith.   
 Mark Juergensmeyer’s concept of “cosmic war” provides a useful 
framework for examining religiously motivated violence.  Cosmic war is broadly 
characterized by a spiritual confrontation between good and evil and is symbolic, 
dramatic, and a moral justification for violence where the outcome of the struggle 
is preordained and victory is imminent.  Cosmic war proponents view events in 
terms of absolutes - right and wrong, good and evil.108  Juergensmeyer defines 
cosmic war as the “metaphysical conflicts between good and evil” that “transcend 
human experience.”109 
 When viewing the ASG through western, non-radical, non-religious eyes, 
we see the ASG as extremely radical.  However, they see themselves as soldiers 
 
107 U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld , “21st Century Transformation of U.S. 
Armed Forces” (speech given at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington D.C. 
on January 31, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183 
(Accessed on 15 September 2007). 
108 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 3rd ed (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2003), 149. 
109 Ibid. 149. 
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fighting for the righteous and adhering to the purest form of religion.  The spiritual 
calling to reclaim their faith seems to resonate with the ASG members and sets 
the stage for hatred which compels its followers to carry out justice.   The 
authority of religion gives the ASG the moral legitimacy to employ violence as a 
spiritual struggle between good and bad. 
 Many of its members are attracted to the group’s rejection of what they 
perceive as the largely Christian Philippine government’s corruption and neglect 
of the minority Muslims in Mindanao.  The growing tension can also be attributed 
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) human rights violations.  Still, the 
ASG’s brutal beheadings, bombings, and kidnappings are barbaric even if their 
grievances are understandable. 
 Rather than focusing on the ASG’s extreme world view and use of 
violence, the U.S. and Philippine governments should look at what they are doing 
that may cause the tension.  Although it may make sense that groups use 
violence to achieve their goals, it is not preferred.  A better understanding of the 
factors that can contribute to violence and how religion motivates and mobilizes 
people is essential in developing a soft power strategy to combat this issue.  
Those who oppose religious terrorism have to find a way of rejecting violence 
without rejecting the religion. 
   Furthermore, the Philippines host two religions that have rivaled each 
other for centuries.  In this case the Christian majority has dominated the Muslim 
minority since the Spanish colonial period.  Furthermore, the conditions in the 
southern Philippines were ripe for an insurgency.  Muslim grievances were 
largely ignored as the situation gradually deteriorated.  Consequently, the Moro 
population became increasing disaffected with their oppressors which ignited an 
insurrection that has waged intermittently for nearly five centuries.  Prior to the 
reinvigorated cooperation between the U.S. government and the GRP, the AFP 
had little success in COIN operations and reducing terrorist recruiting.          
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D. DETERRING EXTREMIST RECRUITING  
 Is there anything distinctive about Muslims in general and Moros in 
particular that makes them especially difficult to reform?  The ASG is a small 
group at the extreme end of a hostile subculture in Islam.  To most Moros, 
Janjalani is no more a representative of Islam than Osama Bin Laden is.  Still, it 
is undeniable that the ideals of the MNLF, MILF, and ASG have resonated with 
thousands of disenfranchised Muslims in the Philippines.  Extremists have used 
religion to justify the use of violence to advance their cause.  Janjalani compelled 
his followers to believe in cosmic war, a spiritual struggle between good and bad.  
In most cases of religious violence, concepts of cosmic war have been 
accompanied by claims of moral justification.  By studying the factors and 
identifying the conditions and triggers that galvanize individuals into extremist 
behavior, a strategy can be developed to retard the process.  
 Since 9/11, there has been an increasing polarization between Islam and 
Christianity.  Rather than focusing on religious fanatics’ extreme world view and 
use of violence, we should look at what we are doing that may be contributing to 
the tension. When national leaders claim that the U.S. is at war with evil and will 
fight to defend America’s righteous cause, they are engaging in a cosmic war - 
and playing into the hands of cosmic warriors.  The U.S. government should also 
consider other factors that motivate and mobilize people to terrorism.  Many 
Muslims cite U.S. foreign policy as their most significant grievance with America.   
Too often policy is myopic and developed in a metaphorical vacuum. 
Joseph Nye defers to Mark Leonard, a British expert on public diplomacy, on this 
matter.  "Leonard warns that many governments make the mistake of explaining 
domestic decisions only to their domestic audiences and fail to realize the effect 
of their actions and the explanations of their actions on the international image of 
their country."110  A common theme expressed by many foreigners is that they 
dislike U.S. foreign policies rather than disliking Americans.  Joseph Nye referred 
 
110 Nye, 108. 
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to several opinion polls taken in 2002 that measured the attractiveness of 
America globally.  Nearly all regions and demographics surveyed showed a 
significant larger attractiveness to American technology advances and culture 
compared to the way America “was doing business.”111  Coincidently the Moros 
have expressed similar dissatisfaction with the GRP policies.  Despite living 
within the same geographic borders, the GRP has thus far has underachieved in 
addressing Moros grievances. To win the War on Terror in Philippines, the GRP 
must institute policies and develop strategies that include the noosphere.  
Furthermore, the central government in Manila direct all the elements of national 
power in the form hard and soft power towards the Moro population.  If the GRP 
sincerely commits to resolving the issues discussed throughout this thesis, their 
prospects for defeating the insurgency are greatly increased. 
E. OPERATIONALIZING SOFT POWER 
 Over the past decade, the U.S. has largely underachieved in wielding its 
soft power while focusing primarily developing its hard power throughout the 
world.  For the first time since the Vietnam War, the U.S. is facing a situation in 
which the appeal of other states and non-state actors is gaining ground and, at 
times surpassing, U.S. soft power.  This change not only affects American 
influence throughout the world, but is terribly dangerous to national security 
because it yields precious ground to insurgents.  The challenge to 
operationalizing soft power is understanding what it is and how it can be used as 
a tool.  The key to operationalizing soft power is to identify America's noöpolitik 
assets and then develop strategies and policies that will boost the nation's soft 
power.   
 Joseph Nye addresses America's need for policy change.  Nye suggests 
that, “We need to adopt policies that appeal to moderates, and to use public 
diplomacy more effectively to explain our common interests. We need a better 
strategy for wielding our soft power.  We will have to better to combine hard and 
 
111 Nye. 42-72. 
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soft power if we wish to meet the new challenges.”112   This is not to suggest that 
soft power is the silver bullet that will eradicate all terrorism.  However, employing 
soft power in the right environment in subtle ways along with hard power 
capabilities may deter those who are susceptible to join radical groups. 
F.  SOFT POWER AND NOÖPOLITIK APPLICATION IN COIN 
 In order to address the underlying conditions that foster terrorism, it is 
important to fully understand the environment that fosters terrorist activities.  In 
Basilan, the ASG was able to gain support of the population by applying both soft 
and hard power tactics.  The group has carried out bombings, kidnappings, 
assassinations, and beheadings for what they claim as their fight for an 
independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.  Their 
methods may create fear among the Filipinos, yet their cause attracts support 
among Moros.  Their ability to appeal to those who share the same ideological 
goals makes it even more challenging for the predominately Christian Filipino 
government to apply soft power.  Meanwhile, hard power practices create a wider 
wedge of distrust between the people and the state.  
 Successful COIN is best achieved through applying a full spectrum of 
power, delicately balanced at the right time in the right manner.  In particular, soft 
power must be applied under conditions where the security environment and 
information atmosphere are stable enough to provide the room for the Philippine 
government to build a relationship with the broader population.  In Southeast 
Asia, where hard power has historically been the primary means of dealing with 
insurgents, the U.S.’s ability to win the war on terror depends on the ability of 
both governments to combine efforts in a manner that levels out the hard power 
imbalance.  
 An alternative approach is found in-between two distinct forces of hard 
and soft power.  On one side are more conventionally focused strategists and on 
 
112 Nye, 131. 
the other side are the “noos”113 minded thinkers.  A balance of pitting the state 
against terrorists with enabling states and their partners to build mutually 
beneficial coalitions will be most effective where insurgents have an edge and 
the state seeks to gain an advantage.  Mindanao, where the AFP and JTF-510 
have pursued the ASG, is ripe for this alternative approach.   
G. BASILAN STRATEGY PORTABILITY 
 Since the successful COIN campaign on Basilan, JSOTF-P commanders 
have not deviated from low intensity warfare that is increasingly focused on the 
civil reconnaissance and addressing civil vulnerabilities in the areas of operation.  
The AFP and the JSOTF have expanded its sphere of influence to other areas in 
the southern Philippines not with violence but through civic action programs.  The 
illustration in Figure 1 is the authors’ graphic representation of power targeting in 
the Republic of the Philippines.114   
 
Figure 5.   Power Targeting 
                                            
113 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Emergence of Noöpolitik: Toward an American 
Information Strategy” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation) www.jstor.org/view/, (Accessed on 
February 2, 2008). 




 Precise targeting is essential regardless of the type of power exercised by 
the state and its elements of national power.  Since the commencement of OEF-
P in 2002, the GRP and U.S. government have very accurately targeted the 
populace, yielding commendable results evidenced by the success on Basilan 
and the on-going operations on Mindanao, Tawi Tawi, and Jolo.  The model 
listed in Figure 1 can be transposed with little modification.  Of course, specific 
regional issues down to tribal issues must be approached differently, but the 
Basilan model and the Power Targeting Model can serve as templates for any 
insurgency.  Furthermore, the distinction between an insurgency and a civil war 
must be recognized.   
H. U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 For nearly a half-century, the U.S. military devoted a considerable amount 
of effort and resources to apply soft power towards the USSR.  Since the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. has scaled down significantly on 
its international diplomacy efforts.  As a result the U.S. has yielded much of its 
control over the noosphere to smaller entities with fewer resources.   
 Exacerbating the problem, the U.S. no longer has an agency that is solely 
dedicated to public diplomacy.  The USIA was deactivated in 1999 and 
reorganized under the State Department.  The Under Secretary for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs is now the proponent for strategic information and 
international diplomacy and has three strategic objectives: 
1. Offer people throughout the world a positive vision of hope and 
opportunity that is rooted in America's belief in freedom, justice, 
opportunity and respect for all; 
2. Isolate and marginalize the violent extremists; confront their 
ideology of tyranny and hate. Undermine their efforts to portray the 
west as in conflict with Islam by empowering mainstream voices 
and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures and contributions; 
and 
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3. Foster a sense of common interests and common values between 
Americans and people of different countries, cultures and faiths 
throughout the world.115 
 
 The Under Secretary's objectives are congruous to the situation; however, 
the bureau responsible for implement the strategy, the Bureau of International 
Information Programs (IIP), is understaffed and under resourced, and, therefore, 
ill-equipped to effectively wield American soft power on behalf of the government.    
 Effective international diplomacy should be comprehensive and executed 
at all levels of the target audience.  Noöpolitik is the instrument the U.S. must use 
to engage foreign audiences.  The precise application of noöpolitik erodes 
extremist influences and diminishes their ability to attract and eventually recruit 
members.  It appears that U.S. strategic information and public diplomacy will 
continue to lag until there is executive level emphasis placed on the program. 
 The U.S. government should consider reinstating the USIA as an 
autonomous agency and adequately equip and fund the agency so that it can 
achieve its stated objectives.  The agency's objectives should focus on the 
original goals of the agency but be tailored to address contemporary audiences.  
Additionally, special consideration must be given to demographics that are 
particularly vulnerable to terrorist recruiting.  By reestablishing a powerful 
presence in the noosphere, the U.S. can counter extremist ideology, mitigating 
terrorist threats.  Furthermore, U.S. efforts directed toward studying the 
conditions before the insurgency, understanding the political environment as the 
insurgency grows, and executing an indirect strategy that recognizes the 
sensitivities and complexities of dealing with radical Islamic groups will offer a 
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